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Oh, they sit under big leaves, of course. We know that 
under all kinds of leaves in the forests and trees and moss, 
especially under mushrooms, there is a lot of life that we 
don't normally acknowledge. Trolls, elves, things like 
that. And I'm sure the butterflies know that too. 
Roald Hoffmann (1981 Nobel prize winner for chemistry 
in reply to the question "Where do butterflies go when it 
rains?") 
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Recently psychologists have found it increasingly useful to view 
the layperson's attempts to reason about the world as similar to 
the processes utilized ,by professional scientists. This work 
attempts to examine this idea by discussing the nature of both 
science and everyday thinking. 
A scientific realist philosophy of science, which emphasises the 
role of theory and method in human knowing, is chosen as the 
best framework for understanding the scientific dimension of 
everyday theories of physics and mind. 
Everyday theories are taken to be vital cognitive entities used to 
embed an organism's immediate experiences within a broad 
explanatory framework. They are generated through a complex 
and dynamic retroductive method which utilizes an organism's 
total knowledge to guide and focus educated guesses about the 
causes of perceived phenomena. An individual's theory 
construction is further constrained by social and biological 
factors. Theorizing is viewed as a vital survival process that is 
firmly anchored in human nature. 
This work concludes that there is no sharp distinction between 
everyday knowing and science, and that both are necessarily 
interrelated at a social level. Philosophies or psychologies that 
claim an independence of the two risk devaluing the knowing 
processes of the masses and thereby perpetuating an 
undemocratic and elitist society. 
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The Changing Views of Science 
and Non-Science 
Well, consider the very roots of our ability to discern truth. Above all 
(or perhaps should I say "underneath all"), common sense is what we 
depend on - that crazily elusive, ubiquitous faculty we all have, to some 
degree or other. But not to a degree such as "Bachelor's" or "Ph.D.". No, 
unfortunately, universities do not offer degrees in Common Sense. There 
are not even any Departments of Common Sense! This is, in a way, a 
pity. (p93-94). 
Douglas Hofstadter (from Metamagical Themas). 
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In the course of this work I intend to examine the idea that people's 
everyday thoughts about the world are akin to theories constructed 
by scientists. Within psychology the metaphor of the layperson as a 
scientist has been central to the study of, what is sometimes called, 
'naive science' (e.g., Fletcher & Haig, 1989; McCloskey, 1983a; Carey, 
1985). Naive science is an umbrella term for a number of related 
research areas in which psychologists have compared laypeople's 
understandings of domains such as psychology, physics, and biology, 
with accepted scientific theories of those domains. Except for a few 
notable exceptions (e.g., Carey, 1985; Wellman, 1990) this research 
has not been unified into a single programme for studying the 
scientific aspects of everyday knowledge. The aim of this work is to, 
in some small way, lay a foundation for such a programme. 
There are two basic steps that one must take in order to fruitfully 
develop this programme. The first involves observing, surveying, 
experimenting, and theorizing about the thoughts and ideas 
everyday people have about various worldly phenomena. This 
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aspect of the everyday science programme has been initiated by 
several researchers studying quite disparate domains. The second 
involves characterizing what it is that scientists actually do. That is, 
we must study the scientific process itself (Fletcher & Haig, 1989). 
Without this perspective, researchers have no solid basis for 
judging the 'scientific-ness' of lay theories. This half of the 
programme remains seriously undeveloped by psychologists. Often 
they are willing to uncritically adhere to philosophies of science that 
have been learnt vicariously from exposure to undergraduate 
textbooks concerning the 'correct' way to experiment and present 
research. 
In this introductory chapter I will provide brief summaries of both 
1) research concerning people's everyday theories, and 2) present 
thinking in philosophy concerning the nature of science. 
1.1. THE GULF BETWEEN SCIENTISTS AND 
LAYPEOPLE 
On the surface it the difference between the thinking processes of 
laypeople and scientists seem quite obvious. Scientists are objective 
and rational, and use a lot of scientific jargon. Laypeople, on the 
other hand, are plagued by inconsistency and irrational, emotion-
laden thoughts. However, these ideas are greatly complicated when 
we find, for instance, that Albert Einstein, perhaps the archetypal 
20th century 'hard scientist', cast as a self confessed dilettante 
(Feyerabend, 1978) and that Isaac Newton, the founder of classical 
mechanics and cofounder of integral calculus, was in fact a keen 
magician, studying alchemy, apocalyptic texts, and other occult 
matters (Capra 1982: 51). 
Take a quick first look at the question. When does a person stop 
being a layperson and start being a scientist? Are some people born 
scientists? Do you become a scientist when you finish your B. Sc. or 
when you read your first science textbook or when you do your first 
experiment? Indeed does a person who calls themself a scientist 
remain a layperson in areas that they do not specialize in or do they 
become some sort of demi-scientist? After pondering these 
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questions for a while it becomes obvious that it is not possible to 
suggest that there is something innately different about scientists 
that distinguishes them from laypeople. To uphold the distinction 
between the two one can take one of two positions. 
The stronger position is to argue that scientists learn to think about 
the world differently from the rest of us. That is, scientists can put 
their folk reasoning aside and plug into what I shall call a rational 
epistemology that is, a privileged way of thinking about the world. 
The idea that there are two types of knowledge, a common 
knowledge and a superior, intellectual knowledge, is a very deep 
seated one, and is shared by many cultures. For instance, in Maori 
tradition the knowledge of kaumatua, tohunga, priests, and high-
status families was distinguished from that of ordinary people as 
being truer and purer (Best, 1923). In Ancient Greece great thinkers, 
such as Plato, made a distinction between opinion (doxa) and science 
(episteme) and placed greater status on science (Weisheipl, 1978). 
Even in Medieval magic there existed a distinction between 'folk 
magic' and 'intellectual magic' (Hansen, 1978). 
The weaker of the two arguments is to suggest that, at rock bottom, 
scientists do not actually think differently from laypeople but that 
they exist within a particular institutional context that sets the two 
groups apart. In the course of this work I intend to argue for this 
point of view, and, based on that argument, establish why other 
points of view are potentially damaging for science itself and society 
as a whole. 
This thesis, then, is about a collision in points-of-view. From ·one 
direction psychologists have recently begun to paint a flattering 
picture of the layperson - the ordinary person in the street, the 
primary school teacher, the carpenter, the checkout operator, the 
accountant, the caregiver - as someone who utilizes complicated 
cognitive resources in their dealings with the world. From the other 
direction, philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science have 
painted a more modest picture of the scientific process and the 
intellectual and rational capabilities of the scientist. To a large extent 
the scientist has come to be viewed as a fallible human being 
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struggling to find out anything useful about the world in the face of 
prejudice and bias. As scientists become viewed as less rational and 
objective and laypeople's thoughts become viewed as useful and 
legitimate, the age old gulf between the intellectual and the intuitive 
begins to shrink. 
In the course of this work I intend to exploit the metaphor of the 
layperson as a 'naive scientist' and the new views of science to 
outline a potentially fruitful direction of research for cognitive 
science which studies human knowing in scientific and everyday 
contexts. The following sections lay the foundation for this approach 
by examining research in the fields of 'naive science' and 
philosophy of science. 
1.2. EVERYDAYTHEORIES 
During the course of this work I will ground my speculations on 
some of the work that has examined laypeople's everyday 
conceptions of various worldly phenomena. Much of this research 
covers only certain aspects of people's theorizing, and, thus, I will 
speculate as to how further aspects could be conceived. Within the 
framework that I sketch it will become apparent that a lot of the 
conceptions of people's theorizing that are common in 
contemporary research will need to be modified - at times in quite 
radical ways. 
Much of psychology, especially the cognitive and social-cognitive 
approaches, has been concerned with how people think about the 
world. A particularly favourite pastime of these researchers is to 
show how people commonly make mistaken assumptions about 
things in domains as diverse as logic, statistics, and the motion of 
objects. Much of this research relies on an unspoken assumption 
that there are correct, scientific ways of understanding these 
phenomena. As I will make clear, this assumption is poorly thought 
out and often wrong. Psychologist's have examined the following 
domains of everyday thinking: 
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Physics, particularly mechanics (Mccloskey & Kohl, 1983; 
McCloskey, 1983; Clement, 1983; Kaiser & Proffitt, 1984; Kaiser, 
Proffitt, & Anderson, 1985; Shannon, 1976), 
Statistics, with an emphasis on Bayesian approaches 
(Kahneman, Slavic, & Tversky, 1982), 
Logic, especially deductive logic (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Wason & 
Johnson-Laird, 1972), 
Biology in terms of the development of concepts (Carey, 1985; 
1988), 
Social cognition based on attribution theories (Fletcher & Haig, 
1989) and, 
Psychology concerned with the theory of mind (Wellman, 1990; 
Forguson, 1989; Gopnik, 1990). 
At times I will refer to these domains of research to elucidate my 
points of view. I will focus on intuitive physics and 'naive' 
psychology in the most detail and offer a brief summary of the 
research below. 
1.2.1. Intuitive Physics 
Intuitive physics research has concentrated on studying our 
perceptions of, and predictions about, the motion of objects. This 
research has revealed an apparent discrepancy between the intuition 
of the layperson and physical reality. It seems that people tend to 
adhere to an 'incorrect' impetus theory of motion rather than 
utilizing physically 'correct' classical theory inspired by Newton. 
The research pioneered by Michael McCloskey and his colleagues 
was aimed at revealing whether laypeople understand and, more 
importantly, apply the following Newtonian principles: 
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1) Given no other forces acting on an object the object will travel in a 
straight line. 
2) An object in motion stays in motion unless another force 
counteracts it. 
To assess whether laypeople applied the first principle McCloskey, 
Caramazza and Green (1980) asked participants to predict the 
trajectory of a metal ball that breaks free from a piece of string as it is 
being twirled about someone's head. The participants were given a 
diagram (see figure 1.1) and instructions to ignore the effects of air 
resistance. The object actually moves in a straight line. The two 
dominant trajectories and the percentage of people adhering to them 
are shown on the diagram. Similar results were obtained using 
variants of this problem, such as predicting the trajectory of a ball 
fired out of a curved tube. 
51% 
Figure 1.1 
Trajectories produced by participants for a metal ball breaking free of 
a rota ting line. 
In order to ascertain whether participants adhered to the second 
principle McCloskey (1983b) asked participants to produce the 
trajectory of a metal ball that had been pushed off a cliff (again 
ignoring air resistance). In reality a metal ball pushed off a cliff 
would trace out a parabolic arc as it moved forward at a constant 
velocity while it accelerated downward. 
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Mccloskey (1983b) found the following pattern of results: 
parabolic 74% arc22% flat4% 
Figure 1.2 
Trajectories produced by participants for a metal ball pushed off a 
cliff. 
In a second group of experiments McCloskey (1983b) asked 
participants to produce the trajectory of a ball dropped from a 
moving conveyor belt or a moving aircraft. In reality the ball would 
follow the same parabolic trajectory as the ball pushed off the cliff. 
However, as can be seen in figure 1.3, the responses to these 
problems were somewhat different to those of the ball and cliff 
experiment. 
After interviewing participants about their responses Mccloskey 
(1983b) came to the conclusion that the majority of laypeople tend to 
adhere to a naive theory of motion which shares many of the ideas 
associated with a Medieval impetus theory of motion propounded 
by scientists such as Buridan, Philoponus, and Avicenna. 
The basic principles behind such a theory are that: 1) the act of 
setting an object in motion imparts to the object an internal force or 
impetus that serves to maintain the object's motion, and that 2) a 
moving object's impetus gradually dissipates, and as a consequence 
the object gradually slows down and comes to a stop. 
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36% 
Figure 1.3 
Trajectories produced by participants for a metal ball dropped from a 
moving aircraft. 
McCloskey (1983b) found that although people seemed to adhere to 
the same basic theory there were differences of opinion over the 
following phenomena: 
Path persistence 
Many people believed that an object will continue to follow the path 
it has been forced into, such as a circular path caused by swinging a 
ball on the end of a rope. However, a few people believed (correctly) 
that an object once in motion must travel in a straight while still 
adhering to the (incorrect) idea of internal impetus. 
Imparting an object with impetus 
Some people believed only pushing or pulling an object will impart 
it with impetus; merely carrying an object and releasing it, as in the 
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aeroplane experiment, would not do it. Others believed that both 
carrying and pushing could impart impetus. 
Interaction of impetus and gravity 
Some people thought that objects with high impetus were 
unaffected by gravity. Others thought that gravity affected all objects 
in motion. 
Dissipation of impetus 
Some people believed that impetus is self expending, while others 
thought that impetus was reduced by friction. Some also thought 
that as curvilinear impetus dissipated the objects trajectory b~came 
gradually straighter. 
Research into intuitive physics has become the archetype for 
studying laypeople's theories. However, intuitive physics has been 
studied in a relatively narrow way, concentrating on mechanics 
using textbook-like problems. It is clear that lay physics is probably a 
much wider theory encompassing topics such as light, sound, mass, 
and time. 
1.2.2. Folk Psychology 
Recently there has been increasing interest in laypeople's theories 
about the structures that are responsible for people's actions. This 
everyday theory has been called naive, common sense, or folk 
psychology. The literature covers two main areas: the development 
of this theory through childhood (see Wellman, 1990; Gopnik, 1990; 
Forguson, 1989), and arguments over whether the lay theory is 
actually a good basis for a scientific understanding of people's 
psychology (see Fodor, 1987; Stich, 1983; Kuhn, 1989; Horgan & 
Woodward, 1985; Bechtel, 1985; Clark, 1987; Graham, 1987; Graham 
& Horgan, 1988; Lyons, 1991). Researchers suggest that, of all lay 
theories, commonsense psychology is likely to be one of the most 
complex and accurate, because we are nearly always in contact with 
other people and are constantly interpreting and predicting their 
actions in order to make our lives more predictable and comfortable. 
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In essence commonsense psychology holds that people have beliefs 
and desires about reality ancf' that these beliefs and desires are 
responsible for the actions of people. Lynd Forguson (1989) suggests 
that there are two main components of commonsense psychology: a 
rational psychology and a commonsense realism. 
Rational Psychology 
A rational psychology concedes that people have mental processes 
and that these mental processes are responsible for people's actions 1. 
People's actions are viewed as being mentally rather than physically 
caused. Forguson suggests there are two basic causal mental states: 
desiderative states (or desires) and epistemic states (or beliefs). 
Desiderative states can be viewed as evaluations of epistemic states. 
A person may have a certain belief without it influencing their 
actions, but having a desire for the object of the-belief is likely to, 
sooner or later, result in some sort of action to fulfil the desire. 
These mental states are sometimes called propositional attitudes 
because they are a statement about the world (i.e., a proposition) that 
has been understood in a certain evaluative way (i.e., the person has 
an attitude toward the state of affairs - they believe it is likely, or they 
would like to possess it, and so on). 
Wellman (1990: Chapter 4) suggests that an adult's commonsense 
psychology maintains there are a number of structures, in addition 
to beliefs and desires, in a person's mind that are responsible for 
their actions. He suggests that adults have an elaborate 
understanding of the nature and relationships of perceptions 
(seeing, hearing, smelling), sensations (dizziness, nausea, pain), 
physiology (hunger, thirst) and basic emotions (love, hate, fear, 
anger), cognitive emotions (boredom, surprise, puzzlement), 
thinking (dreaming, reasoning, learning, remembering), beliefs 
(suppositions, expectations, doubts, and suspicions), desires (goals, 
wants, wishes, hopes, fears, and needs), intentions (decisions, plans, 
aims), and actions (hit, grab, search, attend to), within a 
1 I use the word action rather than behaviour because behaviour is a term 
traditionally associated with the merely observable movements of an organism, 
whereas action includes an intentional component. That is, actions differ from 
behaviours because they refer to the intentions, goals, and beliefs of an actor (see 
Wellman, 1990: 99; Parker, 1989; Harre & Secord, 1972). 
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multidimensional framework which incorporates an understanding 
of internal-external activity, a conscious-unconscious continuum, 
and the stability of beliefs and desires. This view of people's folk 
psychology is much more complicated than that proposed by 
attribution theorists (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967) 
who think people attribute causes of people's behaviour based on a 
very few dimensions such as stability and control, and consensus, 
distinctiveness, and consistency (Kelley, 1973). 
Commonsense Realism 
Commonsense realism holds that 1) there is a single physical world 
common to all of us, and 2) that "the world is made up of objects, 
events, and states of affairs that are independent of the thoughts and 
experiences" that people have of it (Forguson, 1989: 15). Because of 
this, commonsense realism implies an appearance-reality 
distinction. Thus, it encompasses the idea that people interact with 
the environment based on their understanding or representation of 
it rather than the actual or real state of the environment. In this way 
commonsense psychology implies that different people may have 
different reactions to, and beliefs about, the same environment. 
Developmental psychologists are interested in the age at which 
children can 'stand in the shoes' of someone else who believes 
different things about someone in the same environment as them. 
In a Piagetian sense they seek to find the boundary between belief-
desire egocentricism and the acquisition of a theory of mind. 
Research suggests this occurs around 3 or 4 years of age (see 
Wellman, 1990; Gopnik, 1990; Forguson, 1989). 
1.3. PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE 
Today many scientists and laypeople have been led to believe that 
the issue of the nature of science is fairly clear cut and widely 
accepted. Nothing could be further from the truth. Philosophers, 
historians, sociologists, and other science researchers have become 
increasingly interested in the aims and products of science. Many 
ideas that people take as gospel truth about science have been 
challenged and thoroughly debunked in this vigorous and growing 
field, sometimes refered to as Studies of Science, Technology, and 
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Society (see Spiegel-Rosing & de Solla Price, 1977). As we have seen, 
psychologists studying the nature of people's everyday theories have 
been keen to contrast them with scientific theories and have pointed 
out the, often major, discrepancies between the two. Often, however, 
the scientific benchmarks that are used as a basis of comparison, 
assume a particular model of scientific rationality that is 
questionable. For instance, the assumption that people's failure to 
apply 1) modus tollens in reasoning tasks (Wason & Johnson-Laird, 
1972 cited in Anderson, 1985), 2) Bayesian inferential statistics in 
social cognition (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), and 3) 
ANOVA-like reasoning in social attributions (Kelley, 1967 cited in 
Gigerenzer, 1990) is an indication that their lack of scientific 
thinking relies heavily on the assumption that formal logic, 
Bayesian statistics, or Fisherian/Neyman-Pearson statistics, are 
typical of the reasoning procedures of scientists. As it happens the 
legitimacy of all of these claims has been challenged (see Thagard, 
1988; Giere, 1988; Gigerenzer, 1990). 
With this in mind I will very briefly outline three basic philosophies 
of science paying particular attention to what they have to say about 
science and non-science, and the nature of theories and scientific 
method. Because these characterizations are so brief I will make a 
number of generalizations which will not apply to some versions of 
the different philosophies. For a more detailed introduction to these 
philosophies see Giere (1988), Churchland & Hooker (1985), Nola 
(1988a), Bhaskar, (1986), Hacking (1983), Leplin (1984), Gergen (1985), 
Kuhn (1970), and van Fraassen (1980). 
1.3.1. Empiricism 
Empiricism is the philosophy of science that is largely responsible 
for most of our modern conceptions of science. Eysenck and Keane 
(1990: 1-2) briefly sum it up this way: 
* it maintains that whatever science is, it is objective; 
* this objectivity is considered to be exemplified by cool-headed 
scientists who record the facts about nature through observation 
and experimentation; 
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* it sees scientific knowledge as the result of the amalgamation of 
these facts into law-like generalisations. 
According to this perspective, the scientist's task is no more complicated than 
measuring the temperature of boiling water repeatedly until enough "facts" 
have-been amassed to form the generalisation, "All water boils at 100° 
centigrade." 
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Empiricism is a philosophy of science that it deeply entrenched in 
the 17th and 18th century western culture (see Gardner, 1985; Capra, 
1982; Hooker, 1985). Over these centuries there was a great debate 
between the rationalists, like Rene Descartes (1596-1650), and the 
empiricists, such as John Locke (1632-1704), David Hume (1711-1776), 
and George Berkeley (1685-1753), about the nature of human 
knowledge. The rationalists held that there were some basic a priori 
truths about reality that could be discovered by rational reasoning 
(such as arithmetic, geometry, and, of course, the mind)( whereas the 
empiricists thought that we can only ever know things through our 
perceptions of them, and thus we can only trust the existence of the 
things we can see. This sort of thinking led to Hume's famous 
regularity view of causation and Locke's thesis that human 
knowledge was entirely learned, inscribed onto the blank slate, 
through our perceptions of reality. These ideas became instrumental 
in the genesis of 20th century behaviourism. Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804) attempted to synthesize rationalism and empiricism with his 
extremely complicated Critique of Pure Reason (1781) silencing the 
debate by the density of his prose as much as with the genius of his 
ideas. After Kant, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), the founder of 
modern sociology, advocated a philosophy which held that the final 
goal of the human mind was to know the world through the 
mechanical, objective sciences as conceived by thinkers such as 
Descartes and Newton. This philosophy came to be called Positivism 
and soon intermarried with empiricism and rationalism to create 
the dominant philosophy of science and society for the next one 
hundred years. From the 1920's to 1940 logical positivism (or logical 
empiricism) was championed by the 'Vienna School' of thinkers. 
Their ideas have had a lasting effect on the nature of modern science 
and technology. 
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Empiricist Theories 
Empiricists are of the opinion that theories are merely convenient 
structures for ordering generalisations of observations. So, for 
instance, they would say that my theory about Jan being an 
introverted person is merely a convenient way of gathering together 
all my observations of Jan being introverted. In particular, my 
hypothesis that there is a dispositional trait of introversion which 
causes Jan's introverted actions, is viewed by empiricists as a useful 
fiction. Empiricists would claim that there is no such functional or 
physical structure as a trait, only that talk of traits makes it easy for 
me to predict and explain Jan's actions. This view of theories is 
known as instrumentalism because it views theories and theoretical 
entities (such as traits) as instruments rather than realities. 
Contemporary neo-empiricists argue that it is necessary for scientists 
to believe that their theoretical entities are real in order to do 
science, but that we can never logically be commited to the this idea 
(van Fraassen, 1980). 
The logical empiricist view of theories also states that good theories 
must exhibit a strict deductive-nomological structure. That is, all 
observations relevant to a certain theory must be deducible (in the 
formal logical or statistical sense) from the cluster of laws that define 
the theory. A theory is thus viewed as a cluster of objective 
observations of reality organized according to the objective process 
of formal logic. In this way logical empiricists thought theories could 
tell us the truth about a reality free of human subjective input and 
fallibility. Neo-empiricists like van Fraassen (1980) have rejected this 
syntactic view of theories in favour of a more sophisticated semantic 
(or set theoretic) approach. However, this approach continues to 
expound an appreciation of theories as abstract, formal entities 
largely independent of people's theorizing activities (see Hacking, 
1983: Chapter 3; Thagard, 1988). 
Empiricist Methods 
In order for scientists to obtain and order objective observations 
empiricists hold that they must be trained in a special, 'rational' way 
to gather data and compile it into theories. Empiricists thus think 
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there are ideal conditions for receiving information about the world. 
In particular, empiricists advocate a passive reception of 
information by someone who is dear-headed and devoid of 
spurious and biasing emotions (Gergen, 1979; Jaggar, 1989). 
The ability to generalise and collate these various objective 
observations is performed by some form of logic. Early logical 
empiricist approaches advocated a syntactic approach utilizing 
foundational (or transcendental, or a priori) formal logic. This 'self 
evident logic' is reminiscent of the rationalism of Descartes and 
others. These empiricists appealed to the idea of pure knowledge - a 
timeless, universal knowledge free of social, emotional, and 
cognitive peculiarities. 
Empiricist method was based around Reichenbach's differentiation 
of a context of discovery and a context of justification. Empiricists 
created a method known as hypothetico-deductivism (HD) in which 
hypotheses are tested by eliciting observations that are deducible 
from the hypotheses. This method is alive and well within the 
American Psychological Association's format for presenting research 
in journals. HD holds that the discovery of theories is a purely 
psychological phenomenon which occurs through chance and 
happenstance. John Tukey (1980) calls it the view of the lightning 
struck researcher. To the empiricists there is no logic to discovery 
and consequently it remains outside of the realm science. Those 
people who submit to the idea that there is a logic to discovery are 
said to commit the sin of psychologism (see Giere, 1988). The 
approach of neo-empiricists implicitly accepts this scheme by 
ignoring the task of generating models and theories (see Thagard, 
1988: Chapter 3). Real science only comes into effect when the truth 
of a hypothesis is ascertained by seeing if predicted observable effects 
occur in an experiment. Karl Popper (1959) made the point that 
hypotheses could never be proved true using such a scheme, as a 
particular observation may be commensurate with any number of 
possible hypotheses. He suggested that a hypothesis could only be 
falsified - that is, if a predicted observation did not follow from a 
hypothesis then the hypothesis must be, in some way, flawed. As we 
shall see Imre Lakatos and Thomas Kuhn later discredited this idea. 
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Empiricism, Scientists, and Laypeople 
Empiricism is a philosophy of science intertwined in the value 
system of the 17th and 18th centuries. Empiricism maintains that 
science functions best through a rationalized epistemology, that is, 
by using special types of logical (or near logical) reasoning. Science, 
thus conceived, is an enterprise carried out by educated, rational 
minds. Traditionally it was thought (and still is by many) that 
children, women, 'barbarians', and the working classes are too 
distracted by emotion and superstition to think clearly and calmly 
enough to be scientific. In the 17th to 19th centuries science itself 
became instrumental in 'proving' that women, children, and non-
Europeans were innately unsuited to scientific thinking because of 
their anatomical and physiological deficiencies (such as having a 
small cranium and large pelvis). Today there is a persistence in 
establishing innate reasons for sex and race differences in thinking, 
especially in the study of hemispheric lateralization (Schiebinger, 
1989: 189-213). 
Empiricism continues to imply that only scientists can usefully 
know about reality. Hooker (1985: 191) elucidates the consequences 
of employing such a philosophy: 
widespread adoption of this position would be a historical socio-political 
mistake for humans, and not simply an intellectual one. It would be a mistake 
because it would reinforce a self-interested and cynical conception of social 
and political life at a time when we desperately need a more humane vision 
of its possibilities and more humane practice for our present tenuous 
civilizing institutions. 
This sort of attitude toward empiricism started to bloom in the mid 
twentieth century and gave rise to alternative philosophies, such as 
scientific realism and constructionism. 
1.3.2. Constructionism 
For centuries there has been a significant school of thought that has 
held that knowledge is a construction of individuals and/or cultures 
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and that there is no way of knowing whether there is any true 
knowledge or any fail-safe ways of acquiring knowledge (Nola, 
1988b). The idea that knowledge is not absolute but relative to an 
individual, culture, classes, languages, species, and so on, has 
become known as relativism and the view that knowledge is 
constructed by the individual, culture, and so on, has come to be 
called constructionism. The two terms are related but not identical. 
Constructionism started to make inroads into theories of science 
about the middle of the 20th century. The turning point in attitudes 
to science occured with the publication of Thomas Kuhn's book The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). In this book Kuhn denied 
the truth of most empiricist beliefs. He argued, amongst other 
things, that there was no sharp distinction between observation and 
theory, that science was not a cumulative enterprise, that science 
does not conform to a tight deductive structure, and that the context 
of justification cannot be separated from the context of discovery (see 
Hacking, 1983). Similar ideas have bee n advanced by Paul 
Feyerabend, who argues there was no one scientific method, the 
Edinburgh school of sociologists of science (Barry Barnes, David 
Bloor, Stephen Shapin, and Donald MacKenzie), feminist 
researchers (Gergen, 1988), and post structuralist literary critics such 
as Derrida and Foucault (Parker, 1989). 
Constructionist Theories 
Perhaps the most radical break that the constructionists make from 
the empiricist view of theories is their claim that the sharp 
distinction between observation and theory is fallacious. They note, 
in a vaguely Cartesian manner, that there can be no such thing as an 
independent and objective observation. They claim that 
observations are always linked to some sort theoretical assumption, 
whether they are obtained as evidence for a theory or found via 
speculation based on a theory. Put simply, constructionists claim 
that we never consciously perceive things without fitting them into 
some sort of explanatory framework. Constructionists are advocates 
of the idea that we do not perceive something without a reason, 
prejudice, expectation, or opinion. 
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The second counterclaim that constructionists make against the 
empiricists is that theories are· socially, not logically, constructed 
entities. A theory is taken to be an entity that helps to solve 
problems but which does not represent reality in any useful way. 
They suppose that theories and other cognitive constructs, rather 
than revealing anything about the nature of reality, are actually texts 
(or statements) that reproduce and instantiate the power relations 
between different social groups (Parker, 1989). As Gergen (1985) put it 
Research on social prototypes, implied personality theory, attributional 
schemata, the concept of intelligence, and the like do not, from the present 
stand-point, inform us about another world - namely an internal, cognitive 
one. Rather they might elucidate the nature of social discourse and thus 
raise interesting questions about the function of such terms in scientific and 
social life. (Gergen, 1985: 270). 
Because of this approach constructionists emphasize the nature of 
paradigms or research programmes in science (Kuhn, 1970; Laudan, 
1977). Although there has been much disagreement about the nature 
of paradigms (Kuhn is said to have used the word in 22 different 
ways [Masterman, 1970]), one can roughly characterise a paradigm as 
a set of shared values about the way a particular domain of interest 
(e.g. memory, money, or mechanics) should be studied. A paradigm 
thus supplies a group of scientists with a basic framework of the 
entities and processes that populate the domain. 
A paradigm is a socially agreed upon way of dealing with a particular 
domain predicated upon values such as "pleasing sponsors, 
convincing colleagues, making claims plausible to many kinds of 
audiences, crafting careers, defending claims against challenge, and 
cooperating in teams and organizations" (Hornstein & Star, 1990: 
423) as much as logic and_perceptions of the so-called real world. A 
paradigm, thus, provides a set of culture-relative building blocks out 
of which more specific theories are constructed. Thus, advocates of 
the dominant cognitivist paradigm in North American social 
psychology will construct specific theories using building blocks such 
as working memory, schemas, propositional networks and so on. 
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In essence, a paradigm focuses the direction of research making 
metaphysical and methodological assumptions about the domain. 
These assumptions are rarely explicitly acknowledged by the 
scientists working within the paradigm. For instance, most North 
• American social psychologists have probably never heard of the 
expression 'the cognitivist paradigm'. Theories thus, become 
implicated in what empiricists would view as biasing social 
expectations and assumptions. 
For constructionists, then, a theory is simply a convenient way of 
dealing with puzzles that plague a particular group of people in a 
certain place at a certain time. What a theory reveals is the way a 
problem is dealt with, not the nature of the underlying reality. 
Constructionist Methods 
For the constructionists, scientific knowledge is created in a social 
and psychological environment rather than through some sort of 
transcendental, a-human logical process. There is the realization 
that knowing and knowledge are distinctly human creations, not 
discoveries of some disembodied 'pure understanding'. The 
universe does not need to have knowledge of itself floating about. 
The universe just is! 
Constructionists go on to argue that humans are so saturated by 
cultural values, prejudices, and opinions that people can have no 
certain knowledge of reality. Indeed, the constructionist stand is a 
little depressing, claiming that we are inevitably sealed in some sort 
of social bubble which prevents us from understanding anything 
about the real world. All of our so-called scientific actions are 
exercises in making life comfortable for certain groups of people 
usually at the expense of other less powerful groups of people (see 
Giere, 1988; Pettit, 1988; Papineau, 1988). 
In practise this view has resulted in Paul Feyerabend (1977) 
advocating an anarchist view of rationality which holds there is no 
privileged method for acquiring knowledge about the world. For 
Feyerabend, anything goes. All methods from shamanism, to tarot 
card readings, to numerology, to folk lore, to formal logic are equally 
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good ways of beginning to construct knowledge. Feyerabend views 
empiricist dogma about scientific method as an overly narrow 
constraint on human knowing. 
Similarly, the more rationally disposed Imre Lakatos (1970) criticised 
Popper's hypothetico-deductivism, claiming that a hypothesis can 
never be refuted solely on the basis of contradictory empirical 
evidence. This is because there a number auxiliary hypotheses 
surrounding a theory's core hypothesis that could be held 
responsible for an experiment revealing evidence contrary to tested 
core hypothesis. In this way the core hypothesis is protected from 
empirical refutation. Lakatos, himself attempted to introduce a 
rationalist solution to this problem (see Hacking, 1983: Chapter 8). 
Kuhn, however suggested that the construction and acceptance of 
theories was more due to, what Lakatos disparagingly called, 'mob 
psychology'. Kuhn rejected the view that scientific method was a 
case of a psychology of discovery and a logic of justification. For him, 
both parts of method were inextricably intertwined and equally 
subject to the nuances of human psychology. 
Kuhn saw science as moving through a series of stages. During the 
period of normal science scientists subscribe to a particular 
paradigm, using it as a basis for relatively minor calculations, 
measurements, and applications. Minor anomalies may occur which 
cannot be understood under the present framework, but which are 
not thought to be important enough to alter the fundamental 
assumptions of the paradigm. However, when anomalies start to 
accumulate and begin to show important problems in the normal 
science paradigm a crisis occurs. After a period of disillusionment 
and confusion the whole problem suddenly becomes clear in light of 
a new set of basic concepts and ideas, that is, in light of a new 
undeveloped paradigm. With this gestalt switch (Kuhn's term for 
the sudden social and psychological insight that the problems make 
sense in light of a new framework of concepts) a revolution 
proceeds. A host of new ideas and ways of dealing with the domain 
are presented for researchers to work on. The cycle is completed and 
a stage of new normal science proceeds. 
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Kuhn made two important related points about this cycle. Firstly, 
concepts shared by different paradigms, such as mass, or oxygen, or 
memory, are said to be locally incommensurable. What Kuhn seems 
mean by this is that, although two paradigms may share the same 
name for a concept, each paradigm is actually refering to a different 
concept. Thus, scientists talking across paradigms may be totally 
baffled by their colleagues use of the term. Susan Carey (1988) gives 
an example of local incommensurability occuring between a mother 
and her four year old son. An adult's concept of a baby is related to 
the concept of animal. That is, a baby, is a very young animal. Young 
children do not share such a conception. For example, the young son 
of one of Carey's friends noted that although pigeons, dogs, people, 
and cats all have babies, worms merely have short worms. 
The essence of his account: babies are small, helpless, versions of bigger 
creatures, who because of their behavioural limitations, require the bigger 
ones to take care of them ... His idea seems to be that worms are so 
behaviourally bankrupt that there is no way for the small ones to have a 
limited repertoire relative to the bigger ones. Therefore, you would not ant to 
call them 'babies'. When pressed by his mother whether you could think of 
short worms as baby worms, he replied that you could if you wanted to, but 
then you might as well think of small rocks as baby rocks (Carey, 1988: 167-
168). 
Related to local incommensurability is the idea that the move from 
one paradigm to another cannot be viewed as any form of progress. 
Kuhn shows how, contrary to the empiricist view, a new paradigm 
does not usually explain everything its predecessor did. Indeed, 
Kuhn suggests that as much knowledge is lost as is gained when a 
scientific revolution occurs. 
Kuhn, thus, showed that science is not nearly as neat and logical as 
had been thought. There is no steady accumulation of knowledge 
about the world through logical scientific method. Rather science 
chops and changes on waves of social and political upheaval, 
focusing on one problem at one moment, on another at the next. 
Sociologists of science, such as the Edinburgh school (Bloor, Barnes, 
and so on [Giere, 1988]), became concerned with how science 
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mediates or intervenes in these political upheavals. Science, then, 
stops being the study of the real world and becomes a much more 
pragmatic social endeavour. 
Constructionism, Scientists, and Laypeople 
According to social constructionism, what sets scientists and 
laypeople apart is not the ability to generate valid knowledge about 
reality but social stratification based on power relations. Scientists 
and technologists are often viewed as being in league with the 
powerful political and social groups, producing knowledge and 
technology which claims to be objective and truthful but which is 
actually a tool for domination and oppression. Although Thomas 
Kuhn (1970) does not make such sweeping statements, his work has 
been used as a platform for the more vocal sociologists, feminists, 
and philosophers to critique the role of science in modern society 
and call into question the motivations of institutionalised Western 
science. 
Despite the emancipatory tones of social constructionism it leaves 
itself open to a number of difficult problems, not the least being that 
it becomes difficult to take constructionism seriously in light of the 
(social constructionist) claim that we can never know if one type of 
knowledge is any more truthful than another. This leaves us in the 
paradoxical situation of admitting that social constructionism itself 
may not be true! Social constructionism paints itself into a corner. 
On one hand it claims that the production of all knowledge, 
including knowledge generated by so-called objective and rational 
means, is heavily influenced by social values and prejudices. On the 
other hand it systematically undermines this potentially 
emancipatory philosophy because social constructionism itself 
(being an example of socially constructed knowledge) cannot be 
known to be true and therefore must not be used normatively to 
initiate emancipatory social policy and action (see Pettit, 1988; 
Manicas & Secord, 1983; Parker, 1989). What is thus needed is a 
philosophy of science that does not self destruct while incorporating 
the important social and psychological aspects of the generation of 
knowledge. The philosophy of Scientific realism attempts to fulfil 
this role. 
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1.3.3. Scientific Realism 
There are two central tenets to scientific realism: 1) that theoretical 
entities such as electrons and long term memory are real things, and 
2) that our theories are, in certain respects and to some degree, 
actually about real things. Scientific realism came into being as a 
reaction to the instrumentalism implicit in both empiricist and 
constructionist views of science. That is, scientific realism is at odds 
with the ideas that theories are merely useful organizing structures 
for objective empirical observations or that theories are solely 
concerned with solving puzzles relative to a particular group's 
needs and goals. As the rest of this work will be heavily based on a 
scientific realist philosophy I will attempt only the briefest of 
characterizations here. 
Scientific Realist Theories 
Scientific realists agree with many of the claims made by social 
constructionists with regard to theories. They accept that there is no 
clear distinction between theory and observation (although some 
observations of the world are less theory-laden than others), and 
thus that empirical evidence in and of itself is insufficient for 
establishing the truthfulness of theories. They agree that social 
processes have a vital role in the generation of knowledge, and they 
concur with the idea that we can never create theories which are 
completely accurate representations of reality. They also hold that 
the contexts of discovery and justification are intimately connected 
and neither purely logical nor totally intuitive. 
However, unlike constructionists, scientific realists focus closely on 
the nature and structure of theories, claiming that they are 
extremely complicated human creations that successfully attempt to 
represent reality with ever increasing accuracy. They believe that 
truth is an important, though unobtainable horizon concept which 
guides and focuses our theorizing. 
Scientific realists substantiate these claims in a number different 
ways. I believe that the best type of scientific realism, Evolutionary 
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Naturalistic Realism (ENR), provides the most convincing 
substantiations (see Hooker, 1985; Giere, 1988). Essentially ENR 
claims that human beings, through processes of biological evolution 
and social change, have acquired the essential physiological and 
functional structures for creating reasonably accurate knowledge of 
reality. ENR embraces the idea that the ability to gain this knowledge 
is a natural ability of all human beings. This is not to say that we 
humans do not, at times, produce fanciful or inaccurate knowledge, 
only that we have evolved (and continue to evolve) the capacity for 
understanding many of the deep causal structures at work in reality. 
For scientific realists, theories that postulate real but theoretical (that 
is, unobservable) entities, are the vehicles for aJl our public 
knowledge about the world (Haig, 1991b). Without theories that 
grasped some essential aspects of reality, argues the realist, human 
beings could not possibly survive as they have. 
Scientific Realist Methods 
Evolutionary Naturalistic Realism takes method to be the most 
important feature of science (Haig, 1991b). Our knowledge of the 
world is generated by both evolutionary and revolutionary 
processes. Scientific realists do not see scientific method as a purely 
logical algorithm for acquiring true knowledge, nor do they see it as 
being entirely due to social and institutional processes. For the 
scientific realist, knowledge is created through biological, social, and 
individual contexts. 
Realists view the generation of knowledge as roughly retroductive 
in nature. That is, they view knowledge as being generated by 
explaining the underlying causes of types of phenomena based on 
the experience of a number of instances of the phenomena. In other 
words, retroduction is the process of making educated guesses about 
why things happen. Retroduction is much less rigorous than formal 
deduction or induction and, in order to be viewed as a valid means 
for generating knowledge, the realist is required to investigate the 
cognitive and social constraints on the educated guesses it produces. 
Retroduction, then, rather than being a type of formal logic, is best 
understood as a pattern of reasoning, whose nature is illuminated by 
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the interdisciplinary study of psychology, sociology, biology, and 
other disciplines. 
Scientific Realism, Scientists, and Laypeople 
Scientific realism, especially in its form as ENR, views all humans as 
capable of generating important knowledge about the world. Theory 
generation is a human capacity not a learned skill. Scientific realism 
does not deny that some groups of people may be better at generating 
accurate knowledge about the world than others, only that 
everybody has the potential to do so when given the freedom to do 
so. Thus, ENR is a philosophy with a normative component. That 
is, it is a philosophy that advocates the view that we need to 
restructure our institutions to better enable people to create theories 
of increasing accuracy. It is a philosophy that views oppressive 
institutions as standing in the way of creating a just world. Indeed, it 
implies that the freedom of knowing is vital for our collective 
survival, and that restrictive or indoctrinary institutions will 
endanger this process. 
Clearly scientific realism exists on a different plane to the empiricist 
view of a value-free and humanless science. Throughout the rest of 
this work I will use ENR as my characterization of science. By doing 
this I hope to show that the theoretical world of the layperson is, in 
many respects, the same as the theoretical world of the scientist. 
And, perhaps more importantly, I will outline how scientific and 
everyday knowledge are inextricably interconnected. 
1.4. STRUCTURE OF THIS WORK 
The rest of this work will discuss a view of cognition which, I 
believe, is adequate for discussing the reasoning processes of both 
laypeople and scientists. In Chapter 2 I examine theories as 
explanatory cognitive entities. I discuss issues such as, the 
relationship of theoretical knowledge to other types of knowledge, 
the structure and taxonomy of theory-like structures, and the 
purposes theories serve. 
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Chapter 3 examines the creation of theories by a natural 
retroductive-explanatory-inferenHal method. Theories are examined 
as dynamic structures evolving through contexts of generation, 
development, and appraisal. The realist approach to method 
favoured in this chapter provides a basis for viewing lay knowing 
and science as similar activities. This is contrary to the views of 
some researchers who suggest that laypeople's theories, while being 
similar in structure to scientific theories, are actually constructed by 
different processes of reasoning. 
Chapter 4 puts theorizing in a wider social and evolutionary context. 
I examine the idea that theorizing does not go on 'in people's heads' 
but through a whole host of social and physical activities and 
exchanges with our environment. I attempt to expose the layperson-
scientist distinction as being due to social stratification rather than a 
difference in rationality. 
Chapter 5 concludes with a brief overview of the work. It ties the 
threads of the previous chapters together in order to outline a basic 




It's impossible to say a thing exactly the way it was, because what you 
say can never be exact, you always have to leave something out, there 
are too many parts, sides, crosscurrents, nuances; too many gestures, 
which could mean this or that, too many shapes which can never be 
fully described, too many flavours, in the air or on the tongue, half-
colours, too many. (p144). 
Margaret Atwood (from The Handmaid's Tale) 
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In Chapter 1 I showed that a discussion of theories is central to all of 
the major philosophies of science. Theories are heralded as the 
vehicles for scientific knowledge. Psychologists concerned with the 
study of the 'naive science' use the metaphor of the layperson as a 
scientist to argue that laypeople also utilize theory-like structures. 
However, it remains to be seen exactly how far we can stretch the 
metaphor with regards to theories. In the course of this chapter I 
will present a way of conceiving theories, whether scientific or 
everyday, as a mental representation used to help us navigate about 
our physical and social environments. Once I have outlined what I 
take a theory to be I will examine what, if anything, distinguishes 
theoretical knowledge from. other types of knowledge. I will close 
with a discussion about the features of scientific theories that m.ay 
distinguish them. from. our everyday theories about the world. 
2.1. WHAT ARE THEORIES FOR? 
Let m.e begin by giving a crude characterization. A theory is a tool for 
surviving in a changing environment. It provides a person (or 
higher animal) with a way of locating im.m.ediate (perceptual) 
experiences in a broader and deeper context of reality. By establishing 
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how an event comes about or what it is related to (that is, by 
explaining an event) we are in a better position to predict what is 
going to happen next (or what has just happened) and are better able 
to ready ourselves for an appropriate survival-enhancing action. Put 
simply, theories give us the drop on reality. But theories are not just 
for helping us to avoid unfavourable events - the picture painted by 
such a conception of the use of theories would be of humans 
continually on the run from danger. Theories also give us the 
capability to control events and, more importantly, they enable us to 
intervene in the world to alter the structures and powers of its 
entities. 
Theories, as survival enhancing mechanisms are, thus, likely to be 
the result of evolutionary processes. Evolutionary theories hold that 
an organism evolves reciprocally with its environment; that is, a 
creature simultaneously alters and is altered by its environment. In 
order for an organism to survive it must develop features for 
survival. These features include not just gross physical features, 
such as a heavy fur coat to protect against the cold, but also various 
behaviours and cognitive processes, such as nocturnal food 
gathering and large memories for buried seeds. 
In many animals, including humans, it is optimal to develop 
complicated nervous systems that can accurately depict the basic 
nature of reality, such as a perception of depth or an ability to 
understand and interpret the behaviour of other organisms. It is this 
ability to depict important aspects of reality which results in the 
construction of scientific and everyday knowledge. Our survival to 
this point in history is an indication that what we believe about the 
world is reasonably accurate and useful (although see O'Hear, 1989, 
for a contrary viewpoint). Thus, the natural, evolved processes that 
we possess for forming these accurate beliefs exist and can be utilized 
to improve our understanding of reality. 
2.1.1. What do Theories Tell Us About Reality? 
Theories explain laws which are generalizations of a number of 
observations (Thagard, 1988). This particular view of theories is 
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usually closely associated with the logical positivist philosophy of 
science. This philosophy maintains that each of the lower levels of 
this hierarchy should be deducible from the higher levels (the 
deductive-nomological theory of explanation), that theories are 
merely tools for describing groups of observations (instrumentalist 
view of theories), and that observations are privileged types of 
information which provide us with the only sure foundation of 
knowledge (foundationalist theory of knowledge). All of these 
theses have been called into question, and, I think, thoroughly 
debunked. The theory-law-observation hierarchy however remains 
a useful one. What it provides us with is an idea of theory as an 
entity which attempts to explain patterns of real world phenomena. 
To a creature that based all of its understanding of the world on basic 
sensations the world could appear to be of a multitude of dissimilar 
and unrelated things. No two events or objects would appear to be 
the same and the creature would have no basis for acting in a 
meaningful or predetermined manner. We do not perceive it this 
way because we have a capacity to generalize (that is, cluster certain 
temporally or physically similar observations together) based on 
fundamental biological knowledge. These generalizations are 
further clustered by unpacking deeper similarities through the 
process of explanation. Theories, then, provide us with an entrance 
into the unobservable world of reality. Following Wellman (1990), I 
believe they tell us three basic things about this reality: 
1) A theory tells us about the nature, scope, and kind of entities that 
are purported to exist in the domain that it covers. More technically, 
a theory specifies our ontological commitments (what exists) and 
ontological distinctions (how entities differ from each other). This 
knowledge actually defines and characterizes the domain in 
question by establishing how we categorize and relate to relevant 
phenomena. A theory, then, provides us with an ontology. 
2) A theory tells us how these entities relate to each other. That is, a 
theory explains the entities. Often this involves positing the causes 
of events or things. Thus, a theory provides us with an explanatory 
framework. 
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3) A theory tells us (often implicitly) how we should go about 
interacting with the phenomena· in the domain in question. That is, 
it provides us with a basis for further developing ideas and plans of 
action for dealing with the domain. In this sense a theory provides 
us with methodological constraints. 
In sum, theories can be viewed as 'extending our perception', of 
giving us a view of the reality beyond our narrow sensorimotor 
window. With them we can try and understand the hidden causal 
mechanisms at work in the universe, mechanisms that are 
inaccessible because they are intangible (such as cognitive 
mechanisms or gravity) or too small, too distant in place or time, or 
too dangerous (such as tectonic plates, or the environment in the 
cretaceous period) to get at. 
2.1.2. Theories and Reality 
A scientific realist philosophy of science holds that our best scientific 
theories tell us something about the nature of the reality that they 
are about. Many scientific realists hold that the theoretical (that is, 
unobservable) entities postulated by our scientific theories actually 
refer to real but unseen things. Most scientific realists believe that 
today's scientific theories have made considerable progress 
compared to yesterday's theories. This approach to theories raises 
some interesting questions for cognitive science: Do the everyday 
theories of laypeople achieve this level of 'truthfulness', and, if so, 
how can we support such a contention? 
There is no doubt that everyday theories are useful in the 
environment in which they are intended to be used. For instance, 
Holland et al. (1986) note that nature does not punish us for using 
our intuitive theory of mechanics because, considering the context it 
is used in, it is actually a very useful approximation of the 
movement of objects. 
impetus theory as a set of propositions is a better q-morphism [mental model] 
for the world we live in than for the idealized world Galileo and Newton 
had in mind. Objects that operate under constant conditions of friction do 
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indeed behave as if they possessed an impetus subject to gradual 
diminishment. 
(Holland et al., 1986: 209) 
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However, many anti-realist philosophers contend that a theory's 
usefulness is no indication of its accuracy in depicting the structure 
of reality. My inclination is to say that if a theory helps us to predict, 
explain, intervene, or control real-world phenomena, then the 
theory must capture some of the relevant aspects of that reality; 
therefore, laypeople's everyday theories are intended to give realistic 
renderings of the world. But, as with all claims this bold, there needs 
to be a proviso. People's everyday theories are real only in certain 
respects and to some degree, and many scientific theories are often 
real in many more respects and to a much greater degree. 
Giere (1988) notes that anti-realist philosophers often argue that we 
cannot know that our theories are refering to actual structures in 
reality because historically science has utilized such concepts as 
ether, phlogiston, and caloric as useful theoretical concepts and yet 
they have been later found to be non-existent (see for example, 
Laudan, 1984). Giere (1988: Chapter 4) introduces the idea that the 
map of reality our theories propose is similar to the relevant aspects 
of the real world in specified respects and to specified degrees. A 
theory may differ from reality to varying degrees in that it describes 
the correct type of underlying structure, but gives it too much or too 
little power to cause a certain effect. For instance, we might propose 
a theory about the spin number of a certain sub-atomic particle. Later 
.we may find out that the spin number is incorrect but that the 
particle itself is a genuine entity. A theory may differ from reality in 
some respects because the structure it postulates is actually different 
in some significant way. For instance, scientists in the 19th century 
thought that light waves travelled through space by propagating 
along an elastic substance known as ether. It is now known (or, 
should I say, widely accepted) that ether does not exist and that the 
ether theories were not correct in that respect. However, there are 
many respects in which electromagnetic radiation is like a 
disturbance in the ether (Giere, 1988: 107). In a similar way 
laypeople's understanding of the nature of 'force' as impetus-like, 
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shows that the commonly held lay theory of motion differs in 
significant respects to the classical theory of mechanics, but it still 
captures important aspects of reality. Indeed, the use of the classical 
theory of mechanics to estimate the behaviour of objects at extreme 
velocities results in 'naive errors' in light of the more real general 
theory of relativity. I think the same argument can be extended with 
regards to the recent debates about the usefulness of employing folk 
psychology in a scientific study of thought and action (Graham, 1987; 
Fodor, 1987). Beliefs and desires can be viewed as theoretical entities 
that capture some of the vital aspects of human mental life even if 
they prove to be only loosely related to patterns of neural activity or 
sophisticated cognitive functions explicated by neuroscience and 
cognitive science. Beliefs and desires will still contain rigourous 
enough information about real life for laypeople to effectively 
survive in the social world (see Graham & Horgan, 1988). 
Understood this way we can view laypeople's theories as 
approximately true even if they hypothesize entities or relationships 
that scientists have long since abandoned. 
2.1.3. Theories as Mental Representations 
Within cognitive science the mind is typically viewed as possessing 
internal, mental representations. That is, we are supposed to have 
something 'in our heads' that is separate from the external reality it 
depicts. This can perhaps be viewed as an instance of the old 
Cartesian dualism (Bechtel, 1988a); the view that there is a mental 
world independent of a physical world. In this view a theory can 
usefully be thought of as a mental representation. 
This, however, is by no means the only view of representation. 
There are those who believe that talk of internal or mental 
representation is in error, and that there is no intermediate level 
between public speaking about the world and neurophysiological 
events (e.g., Harre, 1988). 
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Hacking (1983: 103-146) claims that human beings can usefully be 
defined as representers, yet he characterizes representations as public 
and external not private and internal. 
When I speak of representations I first of all mean physical objects: figurines, 
statues, pictures, engravings, objects that are themselves to be examined, 
regarded ... 
Representations are external and public, be they the simplest sketch on a 
wall, or, when I stretch the word 'representation', the most sophisticated 
theory about electromagnetic strong, weak, or gravitational forces. (Hacking, 
1983: 133). 
In this work I prefer to think of theories as mental representations 
and yet, to a large degree, I agree with Backing's characterization of 
representation. First of all, I agree that representations are 
importantly grounded in reality. That is, that not only are our 
representations about real things, but, that regardless of how abstract 
they may seem, they are also constructed by reference to things we 
experience through our senses (Johnson, 1991). This is a point to 
which I return in Chapter 4. Second, in the tradition of John Dewey 
(cited in Hacking, 1983), I dispute the false dichotomy between 
mental and physical, internal and external, and knowing and doing, 
that constitutes the basis for much of modern cognitive science. I 
also agree with Hacking and Johnson's view that the emphasis on 
abstract thinking about reality (and the concomitant ignorance of 
action and body) has resulted in an idealist flavoured philosophy of 
science, that concedes that we may not know anything useful about 
reality. Mental representations are, thus, a complex of evolutionary, 
cultural, and individual processes of bodily interaction with the 
environment. They are of the real world, not separate from it. 
2.2. THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF THEORIES 
2.2.1. The Structure of Theories 
Following Paul Thagard (1988) I feel it is useful to conceive of 
theories as implicit entities that arise as a result of the connection of 
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concepts (including theoretical concepts), rules, and problem 
solutions. Thagard (1988: 40) gives a rough written conceptualization 
of the wave theory of sound as follows: 
Wave theory of sound: 
Concepts: sound, wave. 
Theoretical concept: sound-wave. 
Rules: If xis sound, then xis a wave. 
If xis sound, then xis a sound-wave 
Problem solution: Explanation of why sound propagates. 
Explanation of why sound reflects. 
This example gives us some idea of the nature of the different 
components of a theory: concepts, problem solutions, and rules. 
Concepts 
A concept (or theoretical term) is a characterization of a particular 
entity, relationship, or event. The concepts embedded within a 
theory are tightly linked together in an interrelating web. They gain 
their meaning through their relationship with other concepts. That 
is, their meaning is a function of their interconnections rather than 
stemming from a dictionary-like definition of necessary and 
sufficient conditions (Wellman, 1990; Thagard, 1988: 70). Concepts 
are interconnected in two main ways: First, every concept fits into a 
hierarchy of superordinate and subordinate relationships (by way of 
synchronic categorical rules) and, second, every concept is associated 
with other concepts with which they are similar (whether 
perceptually, causally, functionally, or coincidentally) (see Medin, 
1989) by way of synchronic associative rules (Holland et al., 1986). 
The rules which are associated with the concept do not define it, at 
most they merely roughly characterize it. Rather they link concepts 
together in a coherent network of associations and relationships. 
This, I believe, is what most cognitive psychologists mean when 
they talk about schemas: a massive network of related concepts (see 
Schank, 1982). For instance, the concept of a dog would be connected 
with subordinates such as alsatian, collie, and poodle, and 
superordinates such as mammal, animal, and living thing, as well 
as being associated with concepts such as pet, bone, bark, and so on. 
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Simply put, a concept is a set of pointers to other concepts within a 
theoretical framework (see Medin, 1989). 
One particularly important type of concept is, what Thagard terms, a 
theoretical concept. Here the term theoretical concept is used to refer 
to a concept of a postulated or unobservable entity such as impetus, 
an electron, a belief, a black hole or a sound-wave (see Hacking, 1983; 
Haig, 1991c). Scientific realist philosophers of science often point out 
that good theories will nearly always invoke theoretical concepts to 
unify data and provide explanatory power. For instance, by 
postulating the existence of a sound-wave scientists were able to 
understand why sound reflects and propagates, and thereby provide 
a foundation for constructing all sorts of acoustic technology. 
Problem Solutions 
Problem solutions are procedures that can transform one particular 
situation into another. Typically we start with a set of initial 
conditions (which are problematic) and we seek to show how we can 
change conditions to reach a desired goal state. There are two types 
of related problems: 
1) In the standard problem solving literature the goal of the system 
is an unattained but desired state of affairs. At first a problem is 
typically only vaguely understood. As the problem solution is 
gradually created the initial conditions, the desired goal state, and 
the discrepancy between the two are more fully comprehended. This 
is known as the constraint-composition, or constraint-inclusion, 
view of problem solving (Haig, 1987; Nickles, 1981) and will be 
discussed in further detail in Chapter 3. 
2) The second type of problem is what Thagard calls an explanation 
problem. In an explanation problem the goal state (known as the 
explanandum) is already known to exist (although, like a standard 
problem, it may only be vaguely conceived). 
A problem solution thus consists of a list of initial conditions, a list 
of goal states, a list of associated relevant concepts, and a list of 
(diachronic) effector rules which detail what actions are necessary to 
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solve the problem. Although this characterization of a problem 
solution seems to be quite skeletal, in practice it shows how a 
problem solution in fact is a complicated representation of a 
changing environment, and thus must include information as to 
the structure and powers of theoretical entities. 
Problem solutions are not only useful for solving problems akin to 
the one that they were first generated to solve, but importantly, they 
can be used as 'models' for understanding phenomena in other 
domains that often bear little superficial similarity to the source 
domain. That is, problem solutions can be used as analogies for 
solving problems in domains where there is reason to believe that 
states of affairs share some structural similarity (see Harre & Secord, 
1972; Keat & Urry, 1975). Often a particular problem solution (for 
instance, the model of the hydraulic pump) is postulated as an 
underlying, and as yet unseen, structure responsible for certain 
behaviour (such as blood circulating about the body). Thagard (1988) 
hypothesizes that when a problem solution for one specific domain 
is used to solve a problem in a distant domain, the common 
procedure is abstracted out of the two problem solving situations 
and compiled as a problem schema. 
In traditional cognitive psychology problem solutions have been 
called algorithms if they are step by step procedures for attaining a 
specific, correct goal state, or heuristics if they are general rules of 
thumb that do not always work (see Anderson, 1985: Chapter 8). 
From Thagard's point of view an algorithm is a problem solution 
created to solve a very particular (and typically very well conceived) 
problem (that is, it is pragmatic). A heuristic however is more like a 
problem schema (that is, is more syntactic), an abstraction that is 
more domain general and also more likely to result in an 
inconclusive or erroneous state. Heuristics however are often all we 
have available to begin to solve a novel problem. 
Rules 
Although rules actually comprise concepts and problem solutions, 
theory generation often involves the creation of independent rules 
that join previously existing concepts and problem solutions. For 
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instance, in the characterization of the wave theory of sound at the 
beginning of this section, Thagard (1988) list two rules which join 
together old concepts: if x is a sound, then x is a wave and if x is a 
sound, then x is a sound-wave. Of course, once these rules have 
been generated and appraised we can then view them as part of the 
relevant concept (in this case the sound concept). 
A theory composed of these structures and processes can at once 
represent and characterize a host of entities, their powers and 
relations to other entities, and can supply us with procedures for 
dealing with these entities when we experience them in our 
environment. A theory so conceived is obviously a dynamic 
structure constantly undergoing change and deeply and inextricably 
embedded within an organism's total knowledge. It is with this 
thought in mind that we move onto the next section which 
explicates the possible 'external' relationships between theories and 
theory like structures in the individual's mind. 
2.2.2. The Organization of Theoretical Knowledge 
The picture I hope to be building up is that theories, rather than 
being distinct, explicit structures, are patterns that arise when a 
group of related concepts and problem solutions are activated 
together through hierarchical (subordinate/ superordinate) relations 
and associative relations. In this picture theories overlap 
substantially in the individual's knowledge base to form a more or 
less coherent world view. That is, theories from different domains 
borrow and share concepts to make themselves coherent. In fact, the 
inextricable interconnectedness of our theories is vital for survival. 
Often when we are dealing with a problem it requires all of our 
cognitive resources to cope (see Hooker, 1975 for a discussion of 
these issues in philosophy of science). For instance, crossing a river 
with a group of colleagues may involve knowledge about biology, 
physics, social processes, language, and mathematics. Despite the 
interconnectedness of our theoretical knowledge it is still useful to 
outline different structures and relationships that exist. Knowing 
that we think with a skull full of cognitive soup may sound 
delightfully holistic but it gets us nowhere in trying to establish the 
nature of human cognition. 
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Theoretical knowledge and knowledge processes can be usefully 
understood as being made up of three types of structure: framework 
theories, specific theories, and mental models (Wellman, 1990: 








The relationship of framework theories, specific theories, and 
mental models. 
Framework Theories 
A framework theory or global theory is the cognitive equivalent of a 
paradigm, research tradition, or research programme. That is, an 
framework theory provides us with the basic, broad, and deep 
assumptions about a domain of knowledge. They are so called 
because they provide a frame for the development of specific 
theories within the domain in question. Each framework theory 
tells us what basic entities and processes are allowed to exist in 
specific theories (specifies our ontological distinctions and 
commitments), how these entities interact with each other, what 
events are causally, statistically, or merely accidentally connected, 
and what their powers are (provides a causal/ explanatory 
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framework). Moreover, framework theories tell us how we are 
likely to interact with the phenomena within the framework 
theory's domain. That is, they constrain our methodology. For 
instance, Hooker (1975) notes that global theories specify 1) what is 
and is not observable, 2) how to describe those observations, 3) the 
conditions under what is or is not observable, 4) the instrumental 
means by what is measurable is measured, and 5) the reliability of 
these measures. 
In terms of the theory of method that will be outlined in Chapter 3 
framework theories provide us with the methodological constraints 
that guide the creation and appraisal of specific theories. Thus they 
provide us with four types of regulative principle (see Haig, 1987; 
Haig, 1989). 
1) aim-oriented principles constrain our theorizing by considering 
our need for accurate or useful information (also see Kruglanski, 
1989, 1990). If our aim is only to supply an answer of little 
importance to an acquaintance we are unlikely to spend a great deal 
of time developing a deep theory, whereas we may expend many 
resources constructing a theory whose application may be a matter of 
life or death. 
2) heuristic principles constrain our theorizing by supplying us with 
rough rules of thumb (that have been abstracted from their regular 
usage in other theorizing experiences) and which provide directions 
for understanding certain phenomena. Examples of heuristics 
would include the difference reduction method, means-ends 
analysis, and the working backward method (Anderson, 1985: 205-
220). 
3) metaphysical or ontological principles constrain our theorizing by 
allowing only those relationships and those entities that are part of 
the basic premises about the world to be used in the generation and 
appraisal of theories. 
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Thus, Cartesian particles can only interact by contact, not by action-at-a-
distance. Entities, within Marxist research tradition, can only interact by 
virtue of the economic forces influencing them. 
(Laudan, 1977: 79 cited in Wellman, 1990: 126). 
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4) epistemic values are those values that we use to appraise the 
usefulness and accuracy of our theories. Researchers have suggested 
many general values which scientists use to appraise theories such 
as simplicity, fertility, existential depth, and empirical adequacy (I 
will discuss these in some detail in Chapter 3). However, framework 
theories, through their domain specificity, have a record of the 
weightings that we place on the various values for theories at 
particular stages of development within a particular domain. So, for 
instance, different values would be used to appraise the plausibility 
of a nascent theory about the motion of a ball fired out of a tube, 
than would be used to appraise a developed theory about the mental 
state of your best friend. 
It is important to note that the ontology, explanatory framework, 
and methodological constraints (composed of aim-oriented, 
heuristic, metaphysical principles, and epistemic values) are not 
separate 'routines' in the mind, but rather that they come about 
through the spreading of activation through a complex of concepts, 
rules, and problem schemas. 
Susan Carey (1985) suggests that the average educated Western adult 
possesses something of the order of a dozen framework theories, 
covering such domains as psychology (mind), physics (probably 
mechanics and matter), social sciences (political economy, sociology, 
history), religion, and biology. 
Framework theories do not change quickly, as they provide a secure 
foundation with which to interpret the world. Indeed Imre Lakatos 
(1970) suggests that research programmes will not change until a 
successor exists, such is the importance of a basic metaphysics. As 
Wellman (1990) and Kuhn (1970) note framework theories are not 
likely to change based on seemingly contradictory empirical 
evidence as too much time and effort has gone in to constructing 
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them. Framework theories are of such stature that their central 
tenets are reasonably impervious to contradictory empirical 
evidence. Only major deficiencies with criteria such as consistency, 
scope, fertility, and unifying power can eventually cause an 
framework theory to crumble (see Wellman, 1990; Fletcher & Haig, 
1989). -
Just as we can view problem schemas as abstractions of the 
commonalities of a number of problem solutions, framework 
theories can be viewed as abstractions of the shared features of a 
cluster of similar specific theories. Indeed problem solutions are 
more likely to be found inspecific theories and problem schemas are 
more likely to be associated with framework theories. In his 
cognitive approach to philosophy of science Ronald Giere (1988), 
following the ideas of van Fraassen (1980), views framework 
theories as being constituted of clusters or families of specific 
theories 1 which are joined, not by logical connections suggested by 
empiricist philosophers, but by relations of similarity. For instance, 
he suggests that two specific theories may cluster together because 
one is an approximation of another (Giere, 1988: 86). 
Similarity is an important but extremely loose concept (see Medin, 
1989; Giere, 1988). In Thagard's computational model of theories, 
theories are similar if they share concepts or problem solutions at 
some level of generality, or are joined by rules. Theories can be 
joined by categorical or associative relationships. That is, specific 
theories are similar if activation spreads from one to another. 
Moreover, the similarity of any two theories will change as we 
reconceptualize the domains covered by the theories. For instance, 
someone who changed their understanding of the human mind 
from a Freudian approach to a cognitivist approach is likely to 
change their specific theory of mind from being similar to their 
theory of the steam engine to their theory of a computer. 
1 Giere, like many philosophers of science, actually uses the terms theory and 
theoretical model, rather than framework and specific theory. I think that there are 
enough similarities between the two sets of concepts to warrant their interchange. 
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Specific Theories 
Specific Theories are just that, theories which address a narrower 
range of phenomena under the auspices of a parent framework 
theory. Specific theories address similar issues to framework 
theories. That is, 1) ontological distinctions, 2) a causal/ explanatory 
framework, and 3) constraints on methodology. However, specific 
theories focus more on the ontology and explanation than on 
methodological constraints and thus provide us with a way of 
dealing with particular types of events that framework theories can 
not. In Ian Backing's (1983: Chapter 12) terms, specific theories 
assign values for the numerous free parameters that framework 
theories have. Wellman (1990: 125) describes the relationship of 
framework theories and specific theories this way 
In general, framework theories are said to inspire, engender, frame, and 
constrain specific theories that constitute, articulate, or instantiate the more 
global theoretical positions. This relationship allows a division of labor. By 
generally grounding a theoretical tradition, framework theories permit 
specific theories to address details. Detailed theories can therefore simply 
presume certain background conditions, categories, and facts without 
explicitly defending or testing them. These assumptions are under written by 
framework theories. 
Thus specific theories rely heavily on the 'hidden agenda' of their 
parent framework theory. It is just this hidden agenda that becomes 
a major issue of contention between differing schools of thought, say 
between cognitivists and constructionists. Often the pupils of a 
particular school of thought will only have a vaguely thought out 
conception of the research tradition that they work within. Indeed 
they are often unaware that there are any competing schools. For 
instance, most adherents of the dominant North American 
cognitivist perspective in social psychology probably have little or no 
knowledge of, or interest in, competing perspectives such as 
sociological social psychology, ethogenics, structuralism, or post 
structuralism (see Parker, 1989). Social cognitive psychologists are 
probably more interested in following their own lines of specific 
inquiry, such as examining the nature of mediating variables in 
attributions about close relationships. 
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Specific theories are thus likely to be more amenable to refutation or 
support by empirical evidence than framework theories (see 
Wellman, 1990: 126) although this refutation or support rarely 
affects the basic assumptions that constitute the specific theory, only 
the specific application or instantiation of the theory. Thus, the tools 
and methods remain intact, only their particular use is questioned. 
One important feature of the framework theory-specific theory 
relationship is that often a specific theory, in an effort to articulate a 
specific area of concern within a domain, will blatantly contradict 
some of the features of other specific theories framed by the same 
framework theory. Hacking (1983: 219) notes that 
the best way to maximize phenomena and have the simplest laws is to have 
the laws inconsistent with each other, each applying to this or that but none 
applying to all. 
Similarly Holland et al. (1986) note that it is perfectly possible for a 
person to hold contradictory theories in mind if the theories afford 
some sort of benefit to their holder, the most important being 
economy of time and effort played off against the importance of 
accuracy of judgment. Holland · et al. note that it is more 
advantageous to have a general theory that explains most of the 
phenomena in a domain plus a collection of exception rules to 
account for the phenomena that do not follow from the general 
theory, than to have a theory that explains all of the phenomena in 
question. They give the dramatic example that, in their 
environment modelling system, a changing environment with 20 
properties (each one detected by a binary detector) a single layer 
model (that is, a theory with no exception rules) would require 1 000 
000 rules to predict next states, whereas a 10 layer mental model (that 
is, a general theory with ten different exceptions) would require a 
mere 4 092 rules (see Holland et al., 1986: 66-67). 
Hacking (1983: 7) notes, as Lakatos did before him, that "Every theory 
is born refuted". That is, most new theories cannot account for some 
phenomena in their domain. However, it is only when a significant 
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number or type of exceptions pose important problems for the 
theory that a crisis will occur and a new theory will be needed. The 
classical theory of the motion of objects is a case in point. Newton's 
(relatively) simple theory can explain the motion of most objects 
provided they do not approach the velocity of light (a speed that 
most of us seldom worry about). However an account of the 
behaviour of objects at these high velocities becomes vastly more 
complicated. That is why scientists who plot the trajectories of 
satellites and space probes are content to use more general classical 
mechanics than mathematics derived from the general theory ·of 
relativity. On the other hand classical mechanics has proved to be 
inadequate for scientists engaged in using a cyclotron to fire protons 
at a target at half the speed of light (see Giere, 1988: Chapter 5). 
Mental Models 
Mental models are specific problem representations (Wellman, 
1990). The best way to understand how mental models relate to 
theories is to go back to the idea of explanation. According to 
Thagard (1988: 44) we explain something by fitting a phenomenon 
into "a previously organized pattern or context". Put another way, 
explanation involves locating a schema which elaborates the 
meaning of an event or thing by embedding it in a deeper and 
broader context. For instance, we could explain why we pay for our 
meal before we get it at a fast food restaurant by locating our 
restaurant event schema and locating it within a recognized context. 
As Carey (1985) notes schemas and scripts do not usually provide a 
causal explanation of the situation. Such an explanation would 
require us to delve into the deeper theoretical aspects of the 
situation. 
It is explanatory mechanisms that distinguish theories from other types of 
conceptual structures, such as restaurant scripts. To see this, consider such 
questions as "Why do we pay for our food at a restaurant?" or "Why do we 
order food before the food comes?" The answers to these questions are not to be 
found within the restaurant script itself; the answer to the first lies in the 
domain of economics, where questions of the exchange of goods and services 
are explained, and the answer the second lies in the domain of physics, since 
it involves the directionality of time. 
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(Carey, 1985: 201). 
I believe Carey is half right here. Contemporary philosophers note 
that causal explanation is not the only means of explanation for "we 
explain something by showing what is responsible for it or what 
makes it as it is." (Ruben, 1990: 233). I think Carey's ideas stem from 
an idea that theories and schemas are somehow separate types of 
knowledge structures, whereas, according to Thagard's approach, a 
schema is not an autonomous unit but a set of regularly associated 
concepts within a theoretical framework (see below for a more in-
depth analysis). 
Of course, a common problem with this view of explanation is that 
not all of the things we come across in the world fit neatly into pre-
existing schemas. When we come across a novel situation that does 
not match any of our schemas we construct a mental model to make 
sense of the situation. 
A mental model, then, is a tool that we use to represent our 
immediate environment. It represents the environment in two 
ways: synchron ically and d iachronically. It represents the 
environment synchronically by categorizing the basic entities that 
the organism perceives. The resources for this basic categorization 
are found within the relevant framework theory (and possibly in a 
specific theory as well). The mental model represents the 
environment diachronically by predicting how the environment 
will change, and comparing the predictions with the actual changes 
perceived. If there is a discrepancy between prediction and 
perception then the organism's theoretical system is invoked to 
produce a problem solution to explain the state of affairs. The next 
chapter discusses this process in more detail. Once a mental model 
successfully explains the situation it is 'stored' as a problem solution 
with all of the concepts and problem solutions that were involved 
in its construction, ready to be utilized again in similar future 
situation. Holland et al. [1986] contains an in depth examination of 
mental models. 
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2.3. WHAT IS THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE? 
2.3.1. Theoretical Knowledge and its Contrasts 
Alison Gopnik (1988) claims that theoretical knowledge is to be 
contrasted with innate knowledge, procedural knowledge, and 
empirical knowledge. 
Empirical knowledge 
She takes empirical knowledge to be those episodes or regularities 
that. we remember without specifically interpreting them within a 
theory. Wellman (1990: 6) suggests that there exists a continuum 
of the sorts of knowledge a person might possess. At one end are discrete, 
minimally connected facts about some set of things - for example, since I am 
mythologically naive, my knowledge of mythical creatures such as dragons, 
gryphons, and unicorns, or my (impoverished) knowledge of the vice-
presidents of the United States. At the other end of the continuum might be 
scientific theory about some domain of phenomena. For example, consider the 
knowledge of astronomy possessed by an expert astronomer. 
Similarly, Hacking (1983: 184) suggests that there exist observations 
that are relatively free of theory, such as the observation of a printed 
page, and there are observations that that are massively theory-
loaded, such as an 'observation' of the interior rotation of the sun. I 
agree that there are regularities and observations that we remember 
and that we do not attempt to consciously explain within a 
theoretical framework. As I will discuss later, we only attempt to 
explain something when it is anomalous and important for us to do 
so. There are also a lot of unspoken assumptions we make when we 
observe things but none of these need be theoretical assumptions. 
However, it is unwise to suppose that our descriptions of 
regularities or observations are not theory (or value) guided, 
especially within science. We often make observations with the 
express purpose of 'proving' a point. It is thus dubious to suppose, as 
the logical positivists did, that we can calmly attend to the world 
without interpreting it or seeking to gain information about it. On 
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the contrary, good scientists and attentive laypeople strive to do 
both. 
Gopnik suggests, along with Carey (1985) and Wellman (1990), that 
empirical knowledge is the sort of knowledge stored in scripts or 
schemas. As we have seen schemas are an implicit part of theoretical 
knowledge. Put another way, I suggest that it is possible to elicit 
schema-like information (descriptions of the properties and 
relations that constitute a typical thing or event) from people, 
especially in the traditional laboratory setting where subjects are 
asked for minimal information often after being given little chance 
to reflect upon or theorize about the experiment. However, this is 
not conclusive evidence that human knowledge can be stored 
coherently in an unexplained format. Research into memory 
suggests that we remember meaningful information rather than 
isolated, uninterpreted details (the episodic-semantic 
differentiation). Following Thagard's (1988) lead I would suggest that 
meaningful information is information that has been understood, 
that is, located within a pre-existing pattern. Memory has often been 
cast as a static structure into which experiences are sorted and slotted 
into pigeon holes. More recent models of memory paint a picture of 
memory as a dynamic system where recollections arise from a 
spread of activation through a network of concepts, propositions, or 
units (Eysenck & Keane, 1990: Chapter 5). 
Innate knowledge 
Innate knowledge, according to Gopnik, is that knowledge that is 
hard wired in to our brains by processes of evolution, and is 
triggered by later experiences. In Chapter 4 I examine innate 
knowledge in some detail and conclude that it is vital to a 
developed conception of theoretical knowledge as it enables (in the 
sense that it focuses our perceptual and cognitive processes) us to 
make broad ontological distinctions, to construct basic explanations, 
and carry out relevant actions. Without a framework of innate 
knowledge theorizing would be impossible. 
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Procedural knowledge 
Procedural knowledge is generally held to be "knowledge about how 
to perform various cognitive activities." rather than being 
declarative "knowledge about facts and things" (Anderson, 1985: 
199). Gopnik (1988: 200) contrasts procedural and theoretical 
knowledge by claiming that the former exhibits an "absence of a 
principled relationship between cognitive structures and the 
experimental evidence for those structures [is] not amenable to 
change simply as a result of new information." 
However, Mark Johnson (1991: 10) takes issue with the idea of two 
distinct types of knowledge, claiming that it "cannot carry the 
epistemic weight put on it by those who think that only 'knowing 
that' is knowing in the eminent or privileged mode and that it is 
essentially sentential and propositional." Johnson argues that all of 
our knowledge about the world is both procedural and declarative. 
His argument is intimately related to the role of innate knowledge 
in theorizing in that the body and its movements, which are 
responsible for our characteristic patterns of thinking, are also 
products of evolution shaped by our environment. Indeed, the 
evolution of our cognitive processes is, in a sense, the 
internalisation of our environment. In this way we can 
conceptualize a link between the so called internal and external 
worlds. These issues are examined in more detail in Chapter 4. 
In summary, Gopnik's attempt to distinguish between theoretical 
knowledge and other types of knowledge may serve a useful 
heuristic purpose but the distinctions may not hold much water 
when it comes to examining human cognition and action as an 
integrated activity. All knowledge is, to some extent theory-guided, 
if not theory-laden. Similarly, all human knowledge involves 
innate (that is evolved) 'understandings' of the environment and 
patterns abstracted from our sensorimotor exploration of that 
environment. 
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2.3.2. Everyday Theories and Scientific Theories 
We now have a broad characterization of the structure and purpose 
of theories. It is time to examine the question of the differences and 
similarities between scientist's theories and laypeople's theories. 
First, and perhaps rather obviously, scientist's theories are about 
scientific things. That is, the content of a scientist's theory is usually 
something relevant to their field of study (Giere, 1988). Scientist's 
theories tend to be about things like electrons, molecules, DNA, sex 
roles, or mental images. Laypeople's theories are about things like 
the neighbour's relationships, the state of the family car, and the 
financial problems of friends. The line however becomes fuzzy: both 
laypeople and scientists theorize about the nation's economic woes, 
the effects of pollution, the likelihood of a war breaking out. So 
content can hardly be a deciding factor in the demarcation of 
everyday and scientific theories. 
Lay theories are often accused of being unscientific. But such a 
contention requires its holder to demonstrate that scientific theories 
have some sort of structural difference from our everyday beliefs. 
However, in terms of structure, everyday theories and scientific 
theories are probably quite similar. Both contain concepts, rules, and 
problem solutions, and both are part of a web of framework theories, 
specific theories, and mental models. Thagard (1988: 48) notes that 
he does not "think that we can in general distinguish on structural 
grounds between the systems of and explanations of science and 
those of pseudoscience and nonscience." Even those researchers 
who disagree with the idea that laypeople think like scientists admit 
that it is the process of theory generation that holds the essential 
difference not the structure of the theoretical entities themselves 
(e.g. Kuhn, 1989; Morton 1980). 
Some researchers suggest that scientist's theories are much more 
rigorous than the theories of laypeople. Royce (1978) suggests that 
scientific theories have a habit of progressing through ordinary 
language, programmatic, descriptive, and explanatory stages. 
Theories in the latter categories are more precise conceptually and 
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linguistically, and more theoretically powerful than those in the 
former categories. This rigour arises for a number of reasons such as 
scientists having more time for constructing theories, a greater 
access to technology (books, various types of equipment that extend 
human perception or summarise data) and a supportive social 
environment (a community of experts who can supply provocative 
criticism and ideas). People only generate detailed theories when 
they are highly motivated. Scientists gain high motivation because 
they have chosen a career in theory construction. They are assigned 
tasks which involving explaining extremely complicated, and often, 
extremely important, puzzling phenomena. Finding a cure for AIDS 
would thus motivate a scientist to have a much more detailed 
understanding of biology than a non-scientist, not because the non-
scientist is any less intelligent or less rational, but because they 
cannot understand the puzzling phenomena of AIDS with an 
undeveloped theory of biology. In sum, laypeople have the capacity 
to generate theories of high rigour and precision, if they are 
motivated to do so. Of course, if they do become so motivated they 
become scientists. However, there is no likelihood that they will 
suddenly generate theories with a distinctively 'scientific structure'. 
Everyday theories may be more speculative, less rigourous, and 
plagued by insufferable political, religious, or social prejudices but so 
were many of the scientific theories of the (distant and not so 
distant) past. In the Renaissance thoroughly respectable thinkers 
held that ducks were generated by barnacles and geese by rotting logs 
(Hacking, 1983: 70). It seems difficult to see how theory structure 
could differ importantly between scientists and laypeople. Several 
researchers have come to a similar conclusion (e.g., Wellman, 1990; 
Carey, 1985; Kuhn, 1989). At this point some researchers are perfectly 
happy to concede that scientific theories and everyday theories are 
essentially the same sort of structure. Others, however, argue that 
laypeople and scientists use distinctly different methods for 
constructing their theories. They argue that it is this aspect of 
theories that comprises the difference in rationality between the 
scientist and the layperson (e.g., Morton, 1980; Kuhn, 1989). The 
issue of method is an important one. It is to this topic that I devote 




As there is but one way of conveying food to the stomach, so there is but 
one method of supplying the mind with truth (p8). 
Sophia (from Woman not Inferior to Man: or, a short and modest 
Vindication of the Natural Right of the Fair-Sex to a perfect Equality 
of Power, Dignity, and Esteem with the Men.) 
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In the previous chapter I examined the nature of theories from the 
static and structural point of view of theories as receptacles for 
knowledge. It became apparent, however, that with a deeper 
appreciation supplied by a computational perspective, theories are 
anything but static knowledge structures. Instead theories are 
implicit entities, coming into their own when a spread of activation 
encompasses a range of concepts, problem solutions, and rules. The 
traditional distinctions between theory and method in philosophy, 
and between declarative and procedural knowledge in psychology 
become questionable. Rather, I believe it is preferable to focus on the 
dynamic, procedural aspects of theories and to view static content-
based analysis as a narrow appreciation of knowing (Haig, 1989; 
Thagard, 1988; Johnson, 1991). With this in mind I will demonstrate 
how the theoretical structures outlined in Chapter 2 can be 
illuminatingly conceived as part of a theorizing process or method. 
This will involve an excursion into that vital, but neglected, area of 
philosophy of science concerned with the nature of scientific 
method. I will begin by arguing that laypeople utilize a similar 
method of theorizing to scientists by invoking Haig's (1987; 1989) 
retroductive explanatory inferential theory of method as a 
framework for the processes laypeople use in <;oming to know the 
world. I will conclude by examining the differences between 
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scientific and lay method with reference to Deanna Kuhn's (1989) 
ideas about the strong restructuring of method. 
3.1. DO LAYPEOPLE USE SCIENTIFIC METHODS? 
This question has had a long and varied career in psychology 
particularly in the area of social cognition (see, e.g., Fletcher & Haig, 
1989). On the whole laypeople's rationality have been evaluated 
unfavourably by psychologists. Humanist psychologists have 
suggested that people have a drive toward self actualization, or 
happiness; those with a psychoanalytic bent view the person as 
pushed about by uncontrollable internal drives and desires; the 
behaviourist views the layperson as determined by external 
contingencies; the sociobiologist emphasizes biological and genetic 
determinants. Harre & Secord (1972) suggest that the cognitivist 
tradition sees the layperson as a passive information processor and 
insist that a less mechanistic view of people would cast them as 
information seekers as well as processors. In very few cases have 
laypeople been credited with the rationality of the scientist - a 
rationality that is viewed as overcoming the numerous pushes and 
pulls of drives and shaping conditions. One notable exception 
within the North American tradition is George Kelly (1955). His 
personal construct theory explicitly states that normal people are 
rational creatures. 
man [sic] is in the business to make sense out of his world and to test the sense 
he has made in terms of its predictive capacity. Thus, the model man of 
construct theory is 'man the scientist'. 
(Bannister & Fransella, 1971: 20). 
Attribution theorists such as Heider (1958), Kelley (1967), and Jones 
& Davis (1965) have painted a similar picture of the layperson as a 
'naive scientist'. Parker (1989: Chapter 4) roundly criticises this 
picture because of its elitist connotations - that is, that normal people 
are just like scientists, only dumber. To a large extent I agree with 
this criticism on the grounds that the model of rationality (that is, of 
the ideal scientist) that is proposed and subsequently used to judge 
the layperson, is fundamentally flawed because of its positivist-
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empiricist character (see also Gigerenzer, 1990; Giere, 1988: 172-178). I 
believe that when we consider how scientists really function from 
an Evolutionary Naturalistic Realist perspective, the scientist-
layperson distinction loses a lot of its edge. With this in mind I will 
outline a scientific theory of method that encompasses a more 
realistic type of rationality that both scientists and laypeople seem to 
adhere to. 
3.2. RETRODUCTIVE EXPLANATORY INFERENTIALISM 
Haig (1987; 1989) has outlined a holistic theory of scientific method 
called retroductive explanatory inferentialism (hereafter REI). This 
complicated sounding term is derived from the idea that scientific 
theories are generated through a process of retroductive (sometimes 
called abductive) inference. Broadly speaking retroductive inference 
supposes that we come to notice that a group of puzzling 
observations would make sense if a theory (which we have just 
generated) was true. For example, suppose that over the last few 
weeks I noticed the following puzzling conjunction of events: 
1) Cars pull up outside the neighbour's house in the small hours of 
the morning, 
2) Most of the next day I hear busy noises (filing, cutting, spray 
painting, sanding, and dismantling) going on in the garage, 
3) Every weekend a shady looking character driving a huge covered 
truck appears and I hear the sound of something being loaded onto 
it. 
Suddenly I hit upon, that is, generate, the theory that my neighbour 
is 'processing' stolen cars and selling the parts to the person with the 
truck. The puzzling observations fall into place. What is more, I can 
now use my nascent theory to predict new phenomena (my 
neighbour will appear startled if I turn up unannounced while she 
is loading the car parts onto the truck), and intervene in the 
situation (I can call the police). 
The generation of new knowledge using retroduction is only part of 
the theorizing process. In addition to generation, Haig (1987; 1989) 
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outlines a further four contexts of method. These contexts include: 
problem formulation and selection, data collection and analysis, 
theory development, and theory appraisal. This scheme is 
summarised diagrammatically in figure 3.1. 
Problem selection and formulation 
Theory appraisal Data collection and analysis 
Figure 3.1 
The dynamically interacting contexts of REI 
The basic nature of the additional contexts can be illuminated by 
returning to the example of my criminal neighbour. It is likely that I 
will develop my original theory by positing, by analogy, that the 
situation is akin to other phenomena I am familiar with. Since I 
know relatively little about the underworld, I infer that the situation 
must have similarities with any business - there needs to be a supply 
of materials and thus suppliers, there needs to be customers, my 
neighbour must advertise the fact that she has saleable goods 
somehow, if business is going well she will become wealthy, if not, 
then not. Or perhaps the situation is more like a factory, where my 
neighbour is in fact a worker paid by a boss, merely passing the 
finished goods onto the next employee in the line, the truck driver. I 
have a number of plausible theories at hand. Which one is correct? 
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As I develop my theories I need to appraise them. One way of doing 
this is by testing my theories by experiment. I construct a hypothesis 
to play one theory off against the other. I hypothesize that if I watch 
the exchange between the driver and my neighbour and she accepts 
money then it is more likely that the business model is correct and 
the factory one is not. However, there are flaws in such a plan. It 
may be the case that the business model is correct but no exchange 
goes on. The money is exchanged elsewhere, perhaps through 
automatic bank payments. Or perhaps the factory model is correct 
and the driver is merely passing on the salary from the boss. 
Obviously I need to do more experimenting. No experiment can be 
absolutely conclusive and it may be the case that some experiments 
are just not possible (I could bug my neighbour's house but I do not 
have access to such technology). Obviously there are other criteria 
that can help me judge the likelihood of the truth of my theories. 
Which theory accounts for a larger amount of the facts? Which 
theory produces more accurate predictions? Which theory seems 
simpler and does not seem to require a whole lot of auxiliary 
hypotheses for it to make sense? 
It is obvious that REI requires us to view the construction of theories 
as a complex social and cognitive task. REI is, thus, a theory of 
method that seems more suited to the interests of psychologists 
studying 'naive science' than is the rather stark logical and statistical 
models of reasoning advocated by empiricist philosophers of science. 
Most of the rest of this chapter concentrates on giving a fuller 
characterization of REI than that given so far. I must note at this 
point, however, that it is still a broad and rather skeletal conception 
of the theorizing process which needs to be developed by additional 
empirical and conceptual research. 
Before exploring the contexts of method in more detail I should note 
that there are some caveats to the theory of REI. First, it is important 
to realise that these contexts are not stages that unfold in 
chronological order. Figure 3.1 shows that, in the generation and 
application of knowledge about the world, there exists a whole host 
of feedback loops and parallel endeavours. Indeed, it is important to 
note that scientific method is a recurring cyclic process. Second, not 
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all incidents of science or layknowing require the theorizer to work 
through all of the contexts. It is important to note that this is a 
theory of scientific method and a new theory at that. All that I claim 
is that this is a reasonable framework in which knowing may be 
usefully anchored. Not all individual scientists or laypeople are in 
the business of generating theories. Indeed, within science it is 
common to have a division of labour made up of relatively 
autonomous groups of speculators, calculators, and experimenters 
(Hacking, 1983). What follows, then, is a characterization of the 
contexts that can occur in the theorizing process. It is not a step by 
step algorithm for making theories. 
3.2.1. Problem Selection and Formulation 
The whole theorizing process can be viewed as an attempt to 
establish the exact character of a particular problem so that a solution 
can be found. Such a view of problems is known as the constraint 
composition account (Nickles, 1981; Haig, 1987: 25). 
the constraint-composition model takes a problem to comprise all the 
constraints on the solution, plus the demand that the solution be found. On 
this formulation the constraints do not lie outside the problem but are 
constitutive of the problem itself; they characterize the problem and give it 
structure. The explicit demand that the solution be found arises from the goal 
or goals of the research programme, the pursuit of which hopefully leads to 
filling an outstanding gap in the problem's structure. 
Thus, data collection and analysis, theory generation, development, 
and appraisal are all important aspects of characterizing a problem. 
Problem solving, then, is an extremely complicated process. In 
cognitive psychology problem solving research usually concentrates 
on the solution of well conceived problems, problems whose goals 
and major constraints are made obvious by the experimenter. Take, 
for example, the celebrated Tower of Hanoi problem (Anderson, 
1985: 213-216). With this problem the environment is known to 
consist of three disks of increasing size (A, B, C) and three pegs (1, 2, 
3). The initial conditions consist of having the disks placed one on 
top of the other, the smallest at the top, the largest at the bottom. 
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The goal state is to have the same configuration of disks on peg 3. 
The constraints on the solution include: 1) only the top disk of a 
stack can be moved, 2) only one disk can be moved at a time, 3) a 
moved disk must be placed on a peg, and 4) a larger disk may not be 
placed on a smaller disk. Obviously many of the important aspects of 
problem selection and formulation are supplied to the experimental 
participants. In this sense the problem has already been half solved 
by the experimenter. 
Problem Selection 
Problems are selected based on an organism's goals and 
understandings of aspects of its environment. Solutions may be 
necessary for a number of reasons: for survival, for the sake of 
curiosity, or as a designated task (as is the case for professional 
scientists). As noted in Chapter 2, a problem occurs when a person 
discovers a situation (i.e., they represent a situation based on the 
categorization provided by the relevant framework theory) which 
does not fit into an existing schema. 
The inability to fit the perceived situation into a schema acts as a 
triggering condition for the activation of the problem solving 
process (Holland et al., 1986). This process involves constructing a 
mental model to construct a situation specific problem solution. 
At this point a problem is typically ill conceived. The only thing that 
alerts a person to the fact that there is a problem is the existence of a 
puzzling situation that does not follow from the person's present 
understanding of the world. There is typically no knowledge of 
exactly what is amiss. For instance, take the following example of an 
intuitive physics problem akin to that depicted in figure 1.3 in 
Chapter 1. 
Tom, the pilot of a small plane, has tried to drop a box of medical 
supplies on a marked spot on the ground. To his horror the box has 
sailed 20 metres past the spot and landed in a river. Tom realises 
there is a problem but he has absolutely no idea how it happened -
whether it was due to his mistaken assumption about the motion of 
falling objects, or a gust of wind that caught the box, or that he 
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accidentally hurled the box forward. The realisation of a problem is 
typically accompanied by an emotional reaction, which, as Jaggar 
(1989) notes, is a bona fide intentional appraisal of the situation. 
Tom would become anxious if he did not realise that the box of 
supplies he just dropped in the river were urgently needed. The 
emotional reaction is part and parcel of the selection and 
formulation of the problem, directing later problem solving. 
Problem Formulation 
The formulation of the problem is carried out through construction 
of a mental model through the processes of data collection and 
analysis, theory generation, development, and appraisal. This 
process is constrained by, what Arie Kruglanski (1989; 1990) calls 
cognitive capability and epistemic motivations. 
Cognitive Capability 
A person's understanding of the world is constrained by their 
cognitive capability in two ways: by the availability of knowledge 
(whether or not the person has a relevant schema in memory) and 
by the accessibility of knowledge (whether or not the person can 
activate the relevant schema at that point in time. This can be 
affected by the recency of activation, how regularly a certain schema 
is activated, and these in turn can be affected by stress or lack of 
time). Tom, for instance, has done engineering at university, and 
has a good knowledge of classical mechanics. Therefore, he has 
access to relevant information. However, he has never used these 
ideas out of the laboratory and does not have the relevant schema 
available1• 
Epistemic Motivations 
It is absolutely essential that people have the capacity to differentiate 
important from non-important problems. Motivation is, in a sense, 
the ability to select important problems for in-depth explanation. If 
we were continually bombarded by situations that we felt we had to 
1 Tom is not alone in making such an error. Clement (1983) notes that physics training 
even to university level does not mean that people will provide classical answers to 
motion problems. Holland et al. (1986) note that principles learnt in formal physics 
classes enter into competition with, rather than replace, intuitive principles. In many 
cases the applicability of classical principles is not immediately obvious in object 
motion problems, resulting in the person falling back on intuitive ideas for a solution. 
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solve in intricate detail it is likely we would rapidly become extinct. 
The reverse is also true - paying lip service to major problems would 
eventually result in our demise. 
Kruglanski (1989) suggests that there are four basic epistemic 
motivations: a need for specific closure (a desire for a particular type 
of knowledge), a need to avoid specific closure (a desire to avoid a 
particular type of knowledge), a need to avoid specific closure (a 
desire to avoid a particular type of knowledge), and a need to avoid 
nonspecific closure (a desire to avoid any sort of knowledge). If 
someone wants an answer to a puzzle given a limited amount of 
time or little interest in the solution (that is, have a need for 
nonspecific closure) then the process of theorizing is likely to 
'freeze' - that is, come to an early halt. Conversely someone who has 
a need to avoid nonspecific closure will be unlikely to freeze their 
theorizing. Those with a need to avoid specific knowledge may or 
may not tend to freeze-up depending on the situation (see 
Kruglanski, 1989: Chapter 2). As we will see in Chapter 4, a person's 
epistemic motivation can be greatly influenced by their position 
within social institutions. 
These epistemic motivations can be viewed as arismg out of a 
person's aims and goals for a particular domain of phenomena 
(aim-oriented, regulative principles in framework theories [q.v.]). A 
person who has a particular interest in a certain domain is more 
likely to exhibit a need to avoid nonspecific closure when dealing 
with phenomena from that domain. A person's motivation to 
select, and consequently formulate and solve problems, is also 
constrained by the situation; for example, how much time is 
available, how important it is that the solution be correct (the 'fear 
of invalidity problem'; see Kruglanski, 1989), and how much useful 
information the person can recover from the situation. 
Problems are thus formulated by processes of data collection and 
analysis, and theory generation, development, and appraisal. The 
formulation of a problem typically involves the restructuring of a 
person's theory system through the establishment of new concepts, 
rules, and problem solutions. 
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3.2.2. Data Collection and Analysis 
Theories are by their nature about things in reality and that reality 
finds its way into our theories via the collection and analysis of 
perceptual information. We are constantly collecting data from the 
environment when we move about it. Rarely do we passively absorb 
reality as empiricists would have us believe (Hooker, 1985; Jaggar, 
1989; Gergen, 1979). The information that we receive through our 
sensorimotor window is specially selected information that picks up 
important facets of the environment; that is, it is information that is 
of interest to our survival or relevant to our goals. This information 
can be attended to both consciously and unconsciously through a 
process of cognitive management (Fodor, 1991). Cognitive 
management, according to Fodor, is the process of putting questions 
to nature. It occurs in many organisms as a type of reflex. 
If there are noises off, many organisms will orient reflexively to foveate the 
noise source ... Not because these organisms are designed to like their 
sensations to come in a certain order ... but because they are designed to so 
position themselves that if, for example, it was a Heffalump that made the 
noise, then they will come (and promptly too) to believe that it it was a 
Heffalump that made the noise. They achieve this by turning so that if it 
was a Heffalump that made the noise, then a foveated retinal image as of a 
Heff alump will be formed. And the reason that works is that, on the one 
hand, the world is so constructed that almost nothing but a Heffalump ever 
causes a retinally foveated image to be as-of-a-Heffalump; and, on the other 
hand, the minds of these animals are so constructed that, if an image as-of-a-
Heffalump is foveated on their retinas, a Heffalump belief is thereby caused 
in them. 
(Fodor, 1991: 217) 
Humans, in addition to this reflex, have developed a more 
conscious way of collecting data through cognitive self -
management or, what is more commonly known as, 
experimentation. 
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An experiment to test the hypothesis that P is an environment designed to 
have the property that being in that environment will cause the scientist ... 
to believe P if (but only if) P is true. An experiment is a sort of trick you play 
on yourself; an exercise in cognitive self-management ... An experiment is a 
gadget that's designed (not to cause you to have certain experiences but) to 
cause-the state of your mind to correspond to the state of the world. 
(Fodor, 1991: 211). 
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Data collection and analysis is therefore a directed and selective 
activity, not a passive, global one. 
Analysis 
Collection and analysis are inseparable activities. We collect data by 
experimenting with events and entities in our environment. But 
data never comes to us in a 'raw' form. Rather, they are typically 
organized in such a way as to highlight interesting or important 
patterns of phenomena. Put another way, data are always analysed. 
Our perceptual system provides a basic analysis of environmental 
information, but we often analyse data more deliberately using 
diagrams, graphs, physical models, descriptive statistics, and other 
forms of external representation. This "analyzed data serves as a 
launching pad for the generation of new explanatory theories ... 
Extensive data analysis is important for theory generation because 
thickly described data is more likely to throw up the puzzles that 
prompt the introduction of new theories." (Haig, 1989: 3-4). 
Experimentation 
Experimentation and quasi-experimentation are typical ways of 
intervening in the environment to create data for collection and 
analysis. It is worth reiterating that data do not jump out of the 
environment into our heads but rather are coerced out of reality by 
active experimentation. Experimentation is often taken to be 
peculiar to science. Often psychologists point out that laypeople do 
not experiment scientifically because, for instance, they do not 
adequately differentiate theory and evidence, adjust theories to 
account for discrepant evidence, or isolate variables (see Kuhn, 1989; 
Moshman, 1979). However, as I will argue in the final section of this 
chapter, the conception of scientific experiments typically used in 
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these studies rely on empiricist assumptions about the nature of 
scientific inquiry. Issues of randomization, operationalisation, and 
replicability are likewise unnecessary empiricist additions to the 
scientific concept of experiments (see Haig, 1991a; Greenwood, 1982; 
Hacking, 1983). An experiment is roughly 
a systematic, preplanned sequence of operations and observations where the 
following four conditions obtain: 
a) the system of entities under study is relatively isolated from the 
influence of certain classes of causal factors 
b) other factors are held constant or quasi-constant by the experimenter 
c) still other factors are manipulated by the experimenter, their values 
either being set for different individuals in the system, or changed over time 
at the experimenter's will 
d) output is recorded at the time. 
Note that this characterization of an experiment says nothing about 
apparatus, instruments, measurements, or even being in the laboratory. 
(Haig, 1991a: 1). 
The degree to which variables are held constant, the nature of the 
manipulation and the form of output are all based on "what you 
know about the way that the experimental environment works" 
(Fodor, 1991: 211). A child who has trouble balancing two blocks on a 
balance beam because they do not realise that the position of the 
fulcrum is an important variable is not being unscientific. Rather 
they are not isolating the fulcrum variable because they do not 
conceive of it as an important part of how the experimental 
environment works (see Siegler, 1983). Scientists are just as prone to 
this sort of problem as laypeople are. Procedures for experimenting 
are thus integral parts of our framework theories. They tell us what 
we know about the experimental environment, what entities exist, 
how they interact, and how we can observe and influence them in 
the real world. There is no such thing as an abstract knowledge of 
best experimentation. Every domain has its own procedures for 
experimentation and these are based in good part on the present 
understanding of the phenomena in the domain. When institutions 
such as the American Psychological Association advocate a 
particular way of doing best experiments they run the risk of 
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stultifying the scope of research. Experimental methods can only 
reveal interesting new data if their structure reflects insightful 
understandings of the phenomena they are constructed to deal with. 
Data collection and analysis occur at all stages of the theorizing 
(problem formulation) process (Haig, 1989; 1991a). Experiments 
serve a number of purposes in addition to the much publicised one 
of discovering whether the predictions of a (specific) theory ring 
true. Figure 3.2 shows how data collection and analysis in the form 










The role of experiments in the contexts of theorizing 
In the context of theory generation people use experiments to simply 
explore a puzzling situation, somewhat like a detective carefully 
analyzing the scene of the crime, before any theory is generated or 
any causal mechanism is postulated. Such activities serve to present 
the theorizer with rich patterns of puzzling data which can prompt 
the generation of new theories (Haig, 1991a: 4). Tukey (1980) criticises 
psychology for its lack of concern for getting good data before 
launching into the creation of high brow hypotheses for testing. 
Experimentation also has an- important role in theory development. 
Haig (1991a: 4) notes that 
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In the context of theory development we sometimes create a physical model to 
simulate an otherwise unsearchable process. By manipulating the model and 
seeing how it behaves we infer corresponding processes in the real thing. One 
striking early example of this was Theodoric's use of glass globes in the 13th 
century to simulate the causal role of raindrops in the formation of rainbows. 
Similarly, in social psychology it is sometimes necessary to employ "role 
playing" experiments in order to simulate the participant agents' 
representations of their situations and actions. 
Experiments in the development phase can also involve careful 
measurements of constants and the magnitude of various 
phenomena (Hacking, 1983). 
Finally, experiments serve a purpose in the theory appraisal context. 
We often conduct experiments to see if a certain phenomenon can 
be created based on our theory's conception of the causal structure of 
the phenomena of interest. Experiments in the theory appraisal 
phase often attempt to achieve closure of the experimental system 
(Greenwood, 1982). Once we can regularly create a phenomenon we 
are in a good position to generate a good theoretical conception of 
the causal entities at work. Contrary to popular (empiricist) opinion, 
experiments are never replicated in order to give more support for a 
theory or hypothesis. Rather, as Hacking (1983) notes we usually 
slightly alter our experimental conditions in order to ensure that we 
can regularly produce the desired phenomena. When we have done 
that we know that we have successfully isolated the system in 
question. 
Experimentation, then, is simply a case of fiddling with the real 
world to create data for our theorizing. Laypeople spend a great deal 
of time experimenting - trying to work out how to make a new VCR 
work, playing around with a new computer application, 
constructing a fence that will stay up in loose soil, trying to make a 
meal taste good by substituting new ingredients, seeing if not 
answering back will nip those arguments with your partner in the 
bud. 
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Briefly stated, data collection and analysis is an ongoing process of 
interacting with reality to inform our theories. In the words of 
Francis Bacon (1560-1626), we must "twist the lion's tail" in order to 
learn anything useful from our environment (Hacking, 1983: 246). 
3.2.3. Theory Generation 
Given a pattern of puzzling data people use ampliative inference to 
create or modify knowledge structures such as concepts, rules, and 
problem solutions (Thagard, 1988). Ampliative inference is any sort 
of inference which causes an increase in knowledge. Roughly 
following Thagard (1988) I believe we differentiate two types of 
ampliative inference: descriptive ampliative inference and 
explanatory ampliative inference (Haig, 1989). 
Descriptive Ampliative Inference 
When people simply infer from a specific instance of a puzzling 
phenomenon that all or many other instances of that phenomenon 
will possess the same properties or result in the same events taking 
place, they are engaging in descriptive ampliative inference. No 
attempt is made to explain the underlying causes of the puzzling 
phenomenon. The modification of knowledge through descriptive 
ampliative inference does not just involve generalization, but also 
specialization and concept formation. 
Generalization and Specialization 
Generalization and specialization are complementary types of 
induction. Through generalization some of the conditions of a rule 
are dropped because they are unnecessarily specific. For instance, the 
rule 'IF you stroke a black cat THEN it will purr' can be generalized 
by dropping the 'black' condition. Conversely, a rule can be 
narrowed down (made more specific) by adding extra conditions. For 
instance, the rule 'IF X is an animal with wings THEN X can fly, 
would fail to predict the behaviour of a penguin, and could be 
modified to 'IF X is an animal with wings and is not waddling and 
pudgy THEN X can fly' (Holland et al., 1986: 88-97). Generalization 
(often called enumerative induction) has had a chequered career in 
philosophy and science over the centuries. Critiques by David Hume 
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(1711-1776) and others led peoele to believe that there is no form of 
(enumerative) induction comparable with formal deduction. Indeed 
the problem with constructing a formal induction was probably 
responsible for logical empiricists rejecting the idea of a logic of 
discovery. However, generalization, properly conceived "considers 
not just confirming instances, but also background knowledge about 
variability." (Thagard, 1988: 29). For instance, people realise that the 
property of a metal is likely to be shared by all instances of that 
metal, whereas a human trait, such as obesity, is likely to vary 
enormously amongst its members. This knowledge guides our 
impulses to generalize about different phenomena (Holland et al., 
1986). Thus generalization and specialization are both heavily 
constrained by aim-oriented, metaphysical, and heuristic regulative 
principles embedded in our framework theories. 
Concept Formation 
People also generate new concepts of observable entities (for 
example, a new type of animal), and theoretical entities (such as 
black holes or electrons). An observable concept can be constructed 
by combining other concepts. For example, if a person had never 
seen a giraffe before, a new concept may be formed from concepts 
such as long-necked, spotted, four legged, and so on (see Thagard, 
1988: 65-70). Of course new concepts would only be formed from a 
combination of old concepts if the thing represented by the new 
concept possessed properties that the combination of old concepts 
could not account for. 
For example, "striped apple" is a useful combination, since you expect apples 
to be mostly red or green rather than striped. Similarly, "feminist bank 
teller" is an interesting combination, since feminists are typically expected to 
have more professional occupations and be more politically active than bank 
tellers 
(Thagard, 1988: 66). 
Theoretical concepts (that is, concepts of unobservables) can only be 
created by conceptual combination after explanatory ampliative 
inference has first constructed rules that relate the perceivable 
concepts. For instance, Thagard (1988) notes that the theoretical 
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concept sound wave is constructed by combining the two observable 
concepts sound and wave. However, the only way that these two 
concepts become associated is through the use of retroduction to 
form the hypothesis that sound behaves like an observable wave. 
That is, given the puzzling phenomenon that sound reflects (i.e. an 
echo) descriptive ampliative inference would only result in the 
combination of the concepts sound and reflect, or generalize that 
since this particular sound reflects that all sounds reflect. It remains 
for retroduction to look for the connection of sound and wave. 
Descriptive ampliative inference, although a useful enough process 
for acquiring networks of concepts and laws, has a major failing in 
that it does not attempt to explain the nature of the puzzling 
phenomenon in a way that is useful for decisive intervention in the 
environment. Because of this limitation, explanatory ampliative 
inference (that is, retroduction) is a vitally important to the survival 
of the organism utilizing it. 
Explanatory Ampliative Inference 
Rather than simply combining or modifying knowledge as 
generalization and concept formation do, retroduction uses 
background knowledge to explain rather than describe a pattern of 
data. As the name suggests retroduction is the process of reasoning 
back to (underlying) causes of some puzzling phenomenon. 
Types of Retroduction 
Retroduction can be seen as varying along two dimensions: a 
specificity dimension and a explanatory depth dimension (see Table 
3.1). 
In terms of specificity, a retroduction can be carried out in order to 
explain a specific event or to apply to a broader class of events. For 
example, Tom the pilot may only want to work out why the medical 
supplies did not land on the correct place in this particular occasion. 
He may not be overly concerned with the physics of the problem and 
may merely want to find some sort of simple remedy for the 
problem. If he was particularly interested in this phenomenon 
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(perhaps a similar thing has happened before) he may want to find a 
more general explanation for the puzzling turn of events. 
The explanatory depth of the retroduction is a reflection of how 
'deep' a solution the theorizer is looking for to explain their 
puzzling phenomenon. The theorizer may simply want to fit the 
puzzling phenomenon into some sort of vaguely recognisable 
context or they may want to posit the causal powers and structure of 
the underlying mechanism at work. The epistemic motivation to 
explain a phenomenon (Kruglanski, 1989; 1990) is thus an important 
constraint on the type of retroduction that takes place. A person with 
a desire to avoid nonspecific closure is more likely to opt for an 
analogical general retroduction, whereas a person with a desire for 
nonspecific closure will want to perform a quick simple specific 
retrod uction. 
Table 3.1 
A taxonomy of types of retroduction 
specific general 
simple simple specific simple general 
retroduction retroduction 
existential existential specific existential general 
retroduction retroduction 
analogical analogical specific analogical general 
retroduction retroduction 
Simple Retroduction 
Simple retroduction occurs when we come across a situation and we 
make one or more hypotheses as to their explanation based on 
knowledge that we have. For instance, Tom wants to explain why 
'an object dropped from a height did not fall straight down'. Tom 
also knows that 'an object thrown forward does not drop straight 
down', so, through simple retroduction, he hypothesizes that he 
threw the box forward. 
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Existential Retroduction 
Existential retroduction involves positing the existence of 
unobserved entity as the cause behind the puzzling phenomena. For 
instance, British astronomers posited the existence of a distant tenth 
planet- (Planet X) because they were faced by the puzzling 
phenomenon of the unusual orbits of a group of fifteen comets (The 
Press, 1991). 
Analogical Retroduction 
Analogical retroduction is the most complex and time consuming 
type of retroduction. An analogical retroduction uses an analagous 
problem solution as the speculative explanatory framework for a 
puzzling phenomenon. Thagard (1988: 61) gives the following 
example: 
Suppose you are trying to solve a crime involving the murder of a rich woman. 
You may be reminded of another case in which a rich woman was murdered, 
and in which the hypothesis that she was murdered by her philandering 
husband turned out to be true. Because of the similarity of the cases, you may 
form the hypothesis in the new case that a philandering husband was 
responsible. Such a hypothesis will be flimsy in the absence of further 
evidence, but may be invaluable in suggesting what evidence to gather. The 
form of reasoning here is, Hypothesis H was the right explanation in case Ct 
that is like the current case C2 in many respects, so an analog of H might work 
inC2. 
Generally, the deeper the explanation we seek, the more general its 
application would be. This is, perhaps, one of the central objectives 
of modern science. However, it is possible to imagine someone 
constructing an elaborate analogical retroduction for a specific 
problem, perhaps to impress or convince someone of something. 
Politicians, no doubt, have developed this skill to a fine art! 
Constraints on Retroduction 
Retroductive inference is constrained by regulative principles some 
of which are the deep ontological commitments of our broad 
framework theories. So we only entertain candidate theories that 
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encompass our basic beliefs about the world. Of course, although 
'framework theories are extremely robust they are not inviolate, and 
these regulative principles can themselves be overlooked, given 
adequate reasons (most likely the possibility of a different (partial) 
world view in the form of an alternative framework theory [Hooker, 
1975]). 
The key to useful theory generation is to embrace a thorough-going 
pluralism (Haig, 1989). Pluralism works best in a scientific or lay 
community where different individuals or groups contribute and 
criticise different theories. But the individual can also increase 
chances of attaining the best theory by remaining open minded 
(having a need to avoid nonspecific closure) and entertaining the 
possibility of a number of candidate theories (see Kruglanski, 1989; 
1990; Giere, 1988). 
3.2.4. Theory Development 
Theory generation leaves us with a number of seriously 
undeveloped explanations for our puzzling phenomena. It sets up 
some speculative connections among existing knowledge structures. 
New concepts are introduced by conceptual combination, existing 
concepts are modified by generalization and specialization, 
speculative rules bind previously unconnected problem solutions 
and concepts together. The context of theory development is one 
that attempts to exploit these early 'educated guesses' by following 
through the implications of the new speculative relationships, 
modifying them, and using them as the basis for making novel 
predictions about the puzzling situation. This process is aimed at 
"the mathematical alteration of a given speculation, so that one 
brings it into closer resonance with nature" (Hacking, 1983: 214). 
Theory development involves tying a theory down to make it more 
practical and usable. The process is mathematical because it refers to 
a conceptual tightening that reveals some relatively specific and 
practical procedure for explaining and predicting real-life 
phenomena rather than the ideal phenomena hinted at in the 
speculative phase of theory generation. 
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The Use of Iconic Paramorph Models 
Theory development standardly requires us to detail the nature of 
the theoretical (nonobservable) causal concepts at the heart of our 
theories. This standardly involves reasoning that the causal entities 
are analagous to other structures already known to exist. Put another 
way, we import an existing problem solution from elsewhere in our 
knowledge store, because it involves similar concepts and/ or rules, 
and insert it as the basic causal process underlying the puzzling 
phenomena.2 
Often the models3 we use to do this are (superficially) quite different 
from the puzzling phenomena we are dealing with. They are 
regularly imported from knowledge of different domains. This sort 
of model is said to be a paramorph (Harre & Secord, 1972). For 
instance, William Harvey (1578-1657) based his understanding of the 
circulation of blood on the model of a hydraulic pump. In a similar 
way, much of modern psychology uses the metaphor of the human 
mind as a computer. In both cases we use technological models to 
inform puzzling biological phenomena. Laypeople of ten utilize 
models in their theories about the world. This is sometimes 
revealed in our metaphorical talk. For instance, we might talk about 
someone as having 'a mind like a sieve' or 'being blocked on their 
pathway to success'. Although these statements often seem merely 
colourful and theoretically useless they can actually give us 
important insights into our theoretical concepts of a phenomenon 
(Johnson, 1991). For instance, if we think someone has a mind like a 
sieve we typically blame their mental faculties for any problems that 
occur with regards to their memory. It is likely that we would use a 
different metaphor if we thought that, say, situational factors, such 
as having a busy week, were thought responsible. In this case we 
may think that their 'mind is crowded by stressful thoughts'. 
2Toe use of analagous models in theory development may be confused with analogical 
retroduction in theory generation. Analogical retroduction typically uses superficially 
similar problem solutions as the basis for making a speculation of the general shape 
that the theory should take. In contrast, analogous models in theory development are 
utilized to detail the underlying causal variables and thus the source model often 
comes from a different domain to that being considered in the theory under construction. 
3 In this work I use the terms model, iconic paramorph, and (imagistic) problem 
solution interchangeably. Mental models are related to these entities but are not 
exactly the same. Mental models are entities which give rise to the construction of 
problem solutions (see Chapter 2). 
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In addition to the model coming from a source domain different 
from the domain of the developing theory, these models are usually 
visual or, more generally, imagistic. That is, they provide us with a 
macroscopic model of an unobservable entity. Many cognitive 
scientists hold that it is important that our models are imagistic 
rather than mathematically abstract (Hacking, 1983; Giere, 1988; 
Johnson, 1991). The process of utilizing our sensorimotor experience 
to inform our understanding of things we cannot perceive is argued 
to be a vital and natural process of human cognition. This idea will 
be examined in more detail in Chapter 4. Thus, Harre and Secord 
(1972) call these imagistic problem solutions that are imported from 
different domains iconic paramorphs. 
Thagard (1988: 22-27) gives a simple example of the use of an 
analagous problem solution to solve a puzzling phenomenon. The 
problem consists of inventing a way to destroy a tumour in a 
person's stomach using a special ray, without also destroying 
healthy tissue (this problem is taken from, Duncker, 1945). In an 
experiment by Gick and Holyoak (1980), this problem was found to 
more easily solved when participants were supplied with a model of 
an analagous situation. This situation involved an army storming a 
fortress on four fronts because an insufficient number of soldiers 
could attack from a single front. Thagard suggests this process can be 
simulated computationally in the following manner: 
1) The model problem solution is retrieved through the spread of 
activation through a series of concepts. The puzzled person 
formulates the problem to include concepts of ray, destroy, tumour, 
and so on. Through the directed spread of activation laterally (by 
association of concepts) and hierarchically, the system also activates 
other concepts (ray activates shoot, bullets, guns, weapons, fight, 
army, and so on; destroy activates defeat, conquer, capture). This 
process results in the retrieval of problem solutions linked to these 
concepts, including the solution to the fortress problem. 
2) The analagous model is then exploited to aid in the explanation of 
the puzzling phenomena. Analagous concepts are mapped onto 
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each other (e.g. ray to army, tumour to fortress) and an analogical 
procedure for explaining the phenomena is found (in this case the 
concept split-up). 
3) As noted in Chapter 2, the use of a certain 'high level' procedure 
for explaining or solving a problem results in the abstraction of a 
more general problem schema for further use in later problem 
solving. In this case the problem schema would look something like 
that depicted in figure 3.3. 
If too powerful • then __ ,.,, _____ "' 
Figure 3.3 
The abstracted problem schema from the Capture Fortress and 
Destroy Tumour problem solutions. 
This example is, of course, quite simplistic compared to the use of 
analogy in science and everyday thinking. An iconic paramorph 
would not typically map so neatly onto the puzzling phenomena. A 
person would have to deal with a significant number of 
disanalogies. The iconic paramorph is likely only to provide a very 
rough explanation of the causal structures at work. Initially the 
model merely stands in for the hidden entity, but as it becomes 
apparent how the analogy succeeds, and how it fails, we develop a 
more precise and rigourous understanding of our theories' 
theoretical entities and they take on a independent character often 
far removed from the source model. In physics this is most obvious 
in the particle and wave models of the subatomic world. Hooker 
(1975) notes that these two approaches have permeated Western 
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metaphysics since the Greek philosophers. Each is based on the 
concept of a macroscopic (observable) phenomenon but both have 
evolved to a point where the phenomenon that physicists regularly 
refer to as particles or waves are really nothing like ball bearings or 
ripples in a pond. 
Theory development, then, involves tightening and clarifying of the 
speculative ideas that come about through theory generation. 
3.2.5. Theory Appraisal 
In the processes of theory generation and development regulative 
principles provide constraints on the structure and content of the 
theories we create. However, these principles do not ensure that 
everything generated and developed will be useful or even sensible. 
In order to ensure that our theories make good sense, that is, are 
reasonably accurate representations of the phenomena they depict, 
we need to appraise our theorizing efforts (Thagard, 1988: Chapter 5). 
Inference to the Best Explanation 
The evaluation of our theoretical ideas occurs at all stages of the 
theorizing process (see figure 3.4). We need to appraise, not only our 
highly developed theories, but also our speculative candidate 
theories. Thus, theories at different stages of development must be 
evaluated in different ways. For instance, only developed theories 
can be expected to fit the data in a reasonably precise way. 
A theory is never evaluated without reference to competing theories 
(Haig, 1989; Thagard, 1988). The process of evaluating a theory is 
done through inference to the best explanation (Thagard, 1988; 
Musgrave, 1988). Inference to the best explanation involves finding 
the best theory of those available to explain a certain group of 
puzzling phenomena. It can be regarded as a sensible survival 
strategy because it holds that it is better to have a vague, slightly 
useful explanation of a state of affairs than to have no explanation at 
all. 
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The major problem with using inference to the best explanation as a 
usable concept is characterising what we mean by best. In order for 
our theory system to assess the quality of a theory it needs to possess 
some evaluative regulative principles. These principles are 
sometimes called epistemic values (McMullin, 1983; Howard, 1985) 
because they are statements of what we take to be good indicators of 
satisfactory knowledge. 
Epistemic Values 
Our theory system defines what we take to be valuable knowledge. 
In particular, the type of epistemic values we give priority to are 
influenced by our goals and aims. Fletcher and Haig (1989) list four 
typical scientific aims: truth, understanding, prediction, and control. 
Typically laypeople and scientists have a number of goals in mind 
when they generate theories. On balance, however, people seem to 
want to know the real nature of a phenomenon because such 
knowledge provides us with the ability to usefully intervene in the 
situation. The goals of prediction and control give us very little 
chance to effectively change a situation. Prediction alerts us to what 
the future may hold and we can thus plan to take advantage of such 
a situation, but it leaves us at the mercy of the phenomena in 
question. Control enables us to enforce our desires on a situation but 
it does nothing to utilize or alter the structure of a problem except, 
often, to aggrevate it in the long term. 
Different epistemic values will no doubt manifest themselves in 
scientists who emphasize truth compared to those that emphasize 
control. For instance, Parker (1989) notes that a great deal of social 
psychological research, Soviet as well as North American, has (and 
probably still does have) an image of collective behaviour and 
cognition as unruly, biased, and out of control. He suggests that the 
emphasis on individualism in social psychology goes a long way to 
substantiating oppressive control of the underclasses. So the aim of 
control, in this case, leads us to favourably evaluate theories that 
encompass an individualistic approach. 
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Thus, our epistemic values derive from the view we hold of our 
role in the world. Empiricists hold that science is, or should be, as 
objective as possible. They believe that there is only one valid 
epistemic value, that of empirical adequacy. A theory is empirically 
adequate when independent evidence verifies the predictions of the 
theory. There are two major problems with assuming that empirical 
adequacy is the only valid epistemic value. First, theories 
themselves rarely furnish us with hypotheses that can be tested that 
can prove or refute the theory (Hacking, 1983). Second, newly 
generated theories are often so rough that their connection with real 
phenomena is, to say the least, tenuous. This, however, does not 
mean that the theory is completely wrong. In fact a theory can be 
plausible and show a great deal of potential even when it does not 
seem to be useful or accurate at first blush. Take, for example, 
connectionist architecture. Its early forms were roundly criticised by 
Minsky and Papert (see Pollack, 1989) and quickly went into 
hibernation. Recently the connectionist ideas have come back with a 
vengeance, the earlier problems vanquished by new 
conceptualizations of the paradigm. 
These problems suggest that theory appraisal needs to be based on 
other conceptual criteria as well as empirical adequacy (Thagard, 
1988; Kuhn, 1970). Haig (1989; 1991c) suggests the following 
important conceptual criteria. 
Existential Depth 
Good theories have a detailed conception of the underlying causal 
structure of the relevant phenomena such as subatomic particles or 
social stratification. 
Explanatory Power 
The ability of a theory to account for a large number of facts 
constitutes its explanatory power (Thagard, 1988). Theories do this 
best when an underlying structure or process is postulated which 




This epistemic value involves checking to see whether our 
speculative candidate theories are the result of sound retroductive 
reasoning. Initial plausibility, then, is a check on the effectiveness of 
the regulative principles used in theory generation. 
Fertility 
A good candidate theory has the potential to link disparate 
knowledge by reconceptualizing some basic concepts or by 
hypothesizing rules that link concepts in interesting new ways. A 
theory that postulates a new basic conceptualization of the world is 
likely to be very fertile because it will have far reaching effects on the 
conceptualization of many concepts, rules, and problem solutions. 
Systemic Worth 
A developed theory that coheres with other theories and does not 
have obvious internal consistencies is said to have high systemic 
worth. Systemic worth encompasses the important idea of 
simplicity, the idea that we should prefer a theory that explains a 
number of facts using a lesser number of auxiliary hypotheses than 
competing theories (Thagard, 1988: Chapter 5). An auxiliary 
hypothesis is an extra statement that is required for a theory to 
adequately explain a particular phenomenon. A theory with a large 
number of auxiliary hypotheses, or exceptions, introduces a burden 
to the theory-user by requiring them to expend extra time and 
resources to deal with 'special exceptions'. 
Guide to Action 
Theories, especially developed theories, should prove to have 
important practical consequences for the individual or institution 
that created them. Theories are entities for promoting survival and 
thus cannot be viewed as containers for 'pure knowledge'. In the 
end all theories should be evaluated on the importance or potential 
importance of their practical usefulness. 
Levels of Development and Types of Epistemic Value 
Thagard (1988: 187) notes that "New theories, like children, cannot 
be subjected to the standards of grown-ups." Theories need to be 
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evaluated according to their stage of development. This is done 
through emphasising different' epistemic values according to the 
maturity of the theory. For instance, young theories are unlikely to 
be evaluated mainly on criteria of guidance to action and empirical 
adequacy but it is likely that values such as fertility and initial 
plausibility will be paramount. Figure 3.4 gives a pictorial 




- guide to action 
- empirical adequacy 
Generation 
Development 
Examples of the type of epistemic values relevant to different levels 
of theory development. 
The 'weighting' of the epistemic values at each stage of theory 
development is itself a dynamic process. Through our experiences in 
utilizing theories in practical situations we learn to value certain 
structural features of our theories. As noted earlier, this means that 
our goals and aims play an important role in the type of theory we 
evaluate to be of high quality. In turn our epistemic values can 
influence our other regulative principles. Principles and techniques 
that aid in generating high quality theories will be utilized more 
frequently. Those principles that are not deemed helpful in the 
construction of good theories will be gradually phased out. 
Theory appraisal is a phase concerned with monitoring the 
usefulness and accuracy of our concepts, rules, and problem 
solutions. It both influences and is influenced by an individual's 
goals, aims, and interactions with the environment. 
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3.3. SCIENTIFIC METHODS VERSUS LAY METHODS 
The point of this chapter has been to suggest that REI is a method 
that describes the theorizing processes of both scientists and 
laypeople. This does not mean that scientists and laypeople do the 
same sorts of things with their theories. They do not. Very few 
laypeople have generated theories as monumental as classical 
mechanics or Marxist sociology. These endeavours require time, 
resources, application, and motivation. Rather, this chapter explains 
theorizing as a natural human ability as opposed to some sort of 
esoteric intellectual feat. In philosophy of science parlance, I am 
advocating a naturalized epistemology rather than a rationalized 
epistemology (Giere, 1988: Chapter 1). 
Not all psychologists agree with these sentiments. Deanna Kuhn 
(1989), for instance, believes that the metaphor of the layperson as an 
intuitive scientist breaks down when we analyze the methods expert 
scientists use compared to those of laypeople. Similarly Morton 
(1980: 29) notes 
Theory is risky. It depends on a delicate balance of conjecture and fact, 
imagination and prudence ... Free imaginative hypotheses are allowable in 
science just because they take place within a network of tests, observations, 
and opportunities for critical reflection that ensure public criticism of 
hypotheses and give refuting considerations a chance to appear. 
However, often these sort of objections are based squarely upon an 
empiricist philosophy of science. Thus it is not surprising that these 
researchers find it easy to demarcate scientific and lay methods of 
generating theories. I will demonstrate what I mean by analyzing 
Kuhn's (1989) research in more detail. 
Kuhn critiques two areas of research: the child as scientist 
programme pioneered by Carey (1985), Gopnik (1990), Karmiloff-
Smith (1988) and others, and the layperson as scientist programme. I 
shall pay attention only to the latter, although what I have to say is 
relevant to the child as scientist tradition. 
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Kuhn (1989) believes that there exists a developmental continuum 
of the methods used by novices and experts. Novices, she says, do 
not differentiate between a theory and evidence. 
When theory and evidence are compatible, the two are melded into a single 
representation of "the way things are." When they are discrepant, subjects 
exhibit strategies for maintaining their alignment - either adjusting the 
theory, typically without acknowledging having done so, or "adjusting" the 
evidence by ignoring it or attending to it in a selective, distorting manner 
(Kuhn, 1989: 687). 
Experts, on the other hand, can fully differentiate theory and 
evidence and do not just use theories, but are consciously aware of 
them. 
These ideas share much with the hypothetico-deductive (HD) theory 
of method. Firstly, following HD method, she considers theory and 
evidence to be relatively autonomous aspects of method. However, 
following Thomas Kuhn (1970) and other researchers, I have noted 
that all evidence (or data or observations) is to some extent theory-
laden or theory-guided (see Boyd, 1984 and Hacking, 1983 for more 
detailed analysis of these issues). Even Deanna Kuhn (1989: 687) 
speculates that novices will not utilize or understand contrary 
evidence unless they can appreciate an alternative theory that 
accounts for it. 
Secondly, Kuhn hints that an instance of contrary evidence should 
cause strong concern for the validity of one's theory despite the fact 
that philosophers, such as Popper (1959) and Lakatos (1970), have 
shown that empirical evidence, in and of itself, can neither verify 
nor falsify a hypothesis. 
Kuhn's studies rely heavily on these assumptions. A typical 
experiment in her research consists of providing a group of 
participants with a topic that they probably have formed a theory 
about (such as the cause of prisoners returning to crime or the cause 
of unemployment), eliciting their causal theory, asking them to 
provide evidence for it, to present an alternative theory that others 
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may hold, and thinking of evidence that they may use to 
substantiate a contrary theory. Kuhn found that people with a low 
level of education (novices) would typically not be able to produce 
many alternative theories or generate much evidence for these 
theories. Kuhn took these verbal reports as evidence that novices 
were not theorizing in a scientific way. It is possible, however, that 
the studies were actually measuring people's ability to use the 
h ypothetico-deducti ve method. 
In order for a person to think scientifically Kuhn required them to 
suppose that contrary evidence discredited their theory and that 
supporting evidence confirmed it. However, this rarely holds in the 
real world. Contrary evidence does not cause us to cast out our 
theories as hopelessly inaccurate and supporting evidence is rarely 
an indication that our theory is correct. Only in a closed logical 
world can one instance of evidence provide a conclusive 
demonstration of the validity of a statement. This sort of ideal 
logical thinking has to be learned and many scientists and 
philosophers are familiar with it. Notably the 'experts' in some of 
Kuhn's experiments were PhD candidates in philosophy. Unlike 
hypothetico-deductivism, retroductive explanatory inferentialism 
does not require us to use formal deduction which has been shown 
to be quite elusive for most people (Wason, 1977). It is possible to 
conclude, then, that Kuhn's (1989) studies were attempting to 
measure participant's skills in logic rather than theorizing. 
3.3.1. Experts and Novices 
I think a better place to start looking for differences between 
laypeople and scientists with regards to method is in the field of 
expertise research. I think that if we cast the layperson as a novice 
and the scientist as an expert in a certain domain we gain more 
insight into the scientist-layperson relationship than we do by 
positing a series of developmental stages of rationality. The 
difference between the two approaches is one of level of analysis. 
The developmental approach of Kuhn (1989) sees the difference in 
theorizing methods as a case of strong restructuring. That is, 
scientists have a different basic method of reasoning in all domains 
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in comparison to laypeople. The expertise approach however 
permits us to say that retroductive explanatory inferentialism (or an 
equivalent basic method) is common to all people. Differences in 
specific strategies of experimentation or reasoning are due to a 
person's theoretical conceptualization of a specific domain. That is, 
it is the specific content not a developmental process that causes 
differences in domain specific procedures and strategies (Kruglanski, 
1989). Wason and Johnson-Laird's (1972) studies into laypeople's 
ability to apply the logical process of modus tollens show this sort of 
pattern4• They found that laypeople often could not correctly utilize 
this process but that in certain situations where the content of the 
problem involved the catching of cheats laypeople used it with 
proficiency. This approach, then, allows for scientists to be 
theoretical 'no hopers' in domains that they are totally unfamiliar 
with. 
According to this approach an expert knows more about a given 
field than a novice. Because of the familiarity an expert has with 
their field many of the skills learnt have become complex 
conceptual composites and are unconscious, automatic and often 
quite rapid. (Anderson, 1985; Biggs & Telfer, 1987) 
It appears that experts detect special types of patterns specific to their 
field that a novice would not. For instance, expert chess players can 
memorise many more positions of pieces on a board than novices 
because of the meaningful patterns in which the pieces are arranged. 
However, in a situation where the pieces are arranged on the board 
in a pattern that could not occur in the course of a game, the experts 
and novices remember about the same number of piece positions 
(Chase & Simon, 1973). 
Experts on the whole spend more time formulating a problem than 
novices do. (Anderson, 1985; Sternberg 1985). It seems that the vital 
4 Modus tollens is a rule of inference that states that "if we are given the proposition A 
implies B and the fact that B is false, then we can infer that A is false." (Anderson, 
1985: 264). For instance, if we know that if the switch is pushed then the light will 
come on and we are told that the light has not come on, then we must deduce that the 
switch has not been pushed. 
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part of attacking a problem is getting a clear representation of what 
the problem actually involves. Novices however often spend little 
time on this initial appreciation of the whole and try to deal with 
the most obvious features. Such a reliance on surface data is an 
inefficient way of solving problems which nearly always involve 
hidden conceptual cores which only have tenuous ties to surface 
features. 
All of these differences come about through familiarity with the 
subject matter. Experts are people who have constructed elaborate 
theories of certain domains by virtue of interest in their field, access 
to technology and a supportive social environment. By virtue of 
their extended knowledge they construct at first tentative theories 
and procedures from patterns in that knowledge. Once these 
theories and strategies become second nature these too can be linked 
together with further strategies. Soon the expert's understanding of 
the field leaves the surface level of the observable, that a novice 
would perceive, and moves to the realm of the unobservable. (Biggs 
& Telfer, 1987). Because it is only access to knowledge that 
differentiates experts and novices, and because access to knowledge 
is dependent on social factors we can say expertise is at least partly a 
social product. This means that in order to understand the scientist-
layperson relationship properly we need to examine the social, 
political, and institutional aspects of human knowing discussed by 
many social psychologists and sociologists. It is to these ideas that I 
turn in the next chapter. 
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4 
The Wider Picture 
The ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the ruling ideas: i.e., the 
class which is the dominant material force in society is at the same 
time the dominant intellectual force. The class which has the means of 
material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over 
the mental means of production. (p 78). 
Karl Marx (from Selected Writings in Sociology and Social 
Philosophy). 
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In my brief description of Evolutionary Naturalistic Realism (ENR) 
in Chapter 1, I mentioned that this philosophy of science takes 
evolutionary and institutional factors to be vital in the theorizing 
process. In this chapter I hope to unpack these ideas in some detail. 
4.1. KNOWLEDGE IN THE WIDER CONTEXT 
I find it useful to imagine the makeup of an individual's theorizing 
process as an upside down triangle divided (somewhat artificially) 
into three parts of unequal size (see figure 4.1). The area of each part 
gives a rough indication of how much of the knowledge is shared 
among people, so that the most general sort of knowledge (that we 
acquire through our evolutionary endowment) is shared by all · 
people, and the knowledge that we generate through our own 
private ideas and methods is specific to the individual. 




The three major contexts of knowledge 
4.1.1. Biology, Society and the Individual 
Biological Evolution 
The top part of the inverted triangle concerns our evolved capacities 
for theorizing. David-Hillel Ruben (1977) calls the evolutionary 
contribution to our theories the biological transmit. It can be 
characterized in the following way: 
1) It is insensitive to local (that is, close in space and time) 
environmental conditions, as it changes gradually by natural 
selection over thousands of years. 
2) It provides a foundation to knowledge that is common to all 
members of a particular biological taxon (species, phyla, class, or 
family). Thus, for example, all healthy members of the species homo 
sapiens sapiens have the same fundamental biological capacities for 
knowing. 
3) The biological transmit provides us with a very rough guide for 
theorizing about (and thereby acting on) our environment. This 
process seems to occur in two forms: the first provides us with a 
selection of innate specific theories, or Darwinian algorithms, for 
dealing with biologically important aspects of the environment 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1987); the second provides us with the basic 
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system operating principles (Holland et al., 1986: 41) for generating 
individual theories (Shepard, 1984; 1987; Johnson, 1991). These two 
forms of evolutionary knowledge make up, what I call, a species 
programme. By itself this species programme provides us with a 
minimal understanding of reality, serving mainly to isolate and 
conceptualize the most basic aspects of our environment and 
providing us with some fundamental procedures for survival 
(Ruben, 1977: 110). A more detailed discussion of these ideas occurs 
later in this chapter. 
Social Change 
The middle part of figure 4.1 depicts that knowledge and 
understanding of reality that we have acquired via, what Ruben 
(1977) calls, a social transmit. An obvious example of knowledge 
derived from our socio-cultural environment would be our capacity 
to understand and utilize our culture's language. The social 
transmit can be characterized as follows: 
1) It is more sensitive than biological knowledge to a changing 
environment. Cultures and societies adapt to a changing 
environment (that is, they acquire new forms for dealing with new 
and probably dangerous phenomena) more quickly than the slow 
genotypic and phenotypic changes that occur through genetic 
natural selection (see Dupre, 1987b). 
2) Social knowledge provides us with an essential foundation for 
theorizing about the world. If humans had to rely on their own 
individual efforts to understand the world, there would be almost 
no progress in thinking, activity, or technology. In a sense, the wheel 
would have to be reinvented with the development of every 
generation. Society embodies the ideas of many people in the 
previous centuries. Our language and the shape and structure of 
other institutions and technologies ensure that what has gone before 
is seldom totally lost. Through education, indoctrination, and the 
passing on of oral and written knowledge, we acquire in days, weeks, 
and years what took thousands of years of thinking to achieve. 
Certainly much of what was thought in the past is lost or coloured 
by our present conceptions of reality, but our present social 
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structures serve to embody and retain a vast amount of theoretical 
knowledge. The importance of the social transmit is such that 
philosopher of biology John Dupre (1987b: 329) argues "that cultural 
variation, very probably the product of divergent cultural evolution, 
should be seen as the primary focus for the explanation of human 
behavior." 
3) Although knowledge acquired through the social transmit is an 
integral and vital aspect of our individual theories about the world, 
no person "is bound to it, for [they] can come to critically reflect on 
anything which [they are] taught. That is, [they] can come to critically 
reflect, if the transmission mechanism has operated on [them] by 
respecting [them] as a rational agent, for people who are 
brainwashed, indoctrinated, etc., often are not capable of coming to 
critical reflection." (Ruben, 1977: 110). That is, although much of 
what we learn socially and culturally can be used to survive in a 
relatively static social environment, our ability to adapt and prosper 
in a rapidly changing environment is largely reliant on our own 
individual theorizing abilities. 
A important feature of social knowledge is that it is common to a 
group (culture, society, institution, community, family, dyad, etc.) of 
individuals. It thus provides a basis for communication of ideas and 
cooperative action. If everybody had extremely individual 
conceptions of the world we would expend enormous amounts of 
important time and resources just trying to understand each other. 
We can begin to appreciate this problem when we examine the 
significant problems associated with cross-cultural communication. 
Cultures obviously place different values on different aspects of 
reality and even divide the world up in significantly different ways. 
Individual Development 
The bottom part of figure 4.1 refers to this knowledge that we acquire 
through our own critical, individual reflection about the world. This 
level is concerned with the processes and structures discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3. 
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Individual knowledge is extremely sensitive to changes in the local 
environment. This ability to keep updating our conceptions and 
explanations of the changing local environment ensures our 
continued survival. Social and biological knowledge may be 
particularly well-suited to surviving in a relatively static 
environment but total reliance on them would prove fatal should 
the environment alter. The extinction of many animal species, 
especially with the increasing expansion of humans and their 
artifacts, is a case in point. Many of the birds endemic to New 
Zealand have become extinct or threatened with the introduction of 
mammals from other ecosystems and the widespread deforestation 
and hunting caused by humans. The relative slowness of social 
change has also resulted in the extinction of many cultures. Rome, 
for instance, could not adapt to the pressures of the various 
Germanic and Slavic tribes. Its previously successful policies of 
slavery and conquest eventually proved unwieldy in the changing 
social climate, and thus the social system that embodied these values 
collapsed. An over-reliance on social or biological 'conceptions of 
reality' exacts a high fitness cost on the individual in rapidly 
changing environments. 
When individuals have the capacity to reevaluate the state of the 
local environment and use this as a basis for action, they are more 
likely to deal effectively with that environment. In a sense all 
individuals live within different environments. Only their specific 
conceptions of reality are likely to provide a reliable way of dealing 
with that environment. This does not mean that individual 
knowledge is always successful in adapting the individual to their 
environment. It is certainly the case that people suffer from 
psychological problems of various levels of seriousness in their lives 
because of an inability to adapt to their local environment. 
However, I believe that a significant number of these problems stem 
from an over reliance (whether by force of circumstance or 
otherwise) on social (and to a lesser extent biological) knowledge. 
Crime, unemployment, suburban neurosis, stress related diseases, 
poverty, and so on, may all result in significant 'survival problems' 
for the individual, but they are all cases of a forced over-reliance on 
the social transmit. 
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These three broad levels of knowing continually interact when we 
theorize about the world. It is important to realise that no level is 
more important than any other level. All are necessary. The upper 
levels provide constraints that focus the direction of the lower, more 
specifiG- levels. At the same time the lower levels can override the 
impulses of the more entrenched and inflexible upper levels. The 
picture that evolves is that theorizing is a process that has been 
millions of years in the making, relying on natural selection and 
social change, as much as on an individual's cognitive 
development. 
4.1.2. Vehicles for Knowledge 
So far this broad characterization has said nothing about how 
biology and society can influence our theorizing. Intuitively we 
assume that theorizing goes on in our brains, the product of 
neuronal firings and so on, but it difficult to see how something as 
amorphous and vague as a society can 'make us think things'. 
Similarly, it seems odd that we can have innate knowledge of the 
way the world is. We certainly do not feel as if we instinctively 
know things about reality. How can it be that a collection of proteins 
can be passed on from generation to generation containing the 
knowledge that, for instance, "for any two positions of an object in 
three-dimensional space, there exists a unique axis in space such that 
the object can be carried from one position to the other by a 
combination of a translation along the axis together with a rotation 
about it"? (Shepard, 1987: 263). 
I think the best place to start to clarify these ideas is with 1) the, now 
familiar, triad of ontology, explanatory framework, and 
methodology, and 2) by roughly characterizing the social and 
biological 'vehicles' of these aspects of knowledge. 
As we have seen, a theory can be usefully characterized as an entity 
comprising three components: a collection of concepts (ontology), a 
description of the ways the concepts are related (an explanatory 
framework), and a description of the ways a person can deal with the 
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real life phenomena that the concepts are meant to express (a set of 
methodological constraints). I ·believe that an institution is the 
appropriate vehicle for conveying these ideas socially, and a species 
programme can fulfil the role for evolved knowledge. These two 
entities, like theories, are functional entities and thus provide a 
common level of description for these superficially diverse aspects 
of theorizing. The rest of this chapter is concerned with unpacking 
these ideas in more detail. 
Figure 4.2 gives a rough indication of how these various contexts are 
interrelated. The central area shows the basic relationships between 
framework theories, specific theories, mental models, and 
phenomena, as expressed in Chapter 2. Other relationships have 














The relationship of an individual's theory system to the wider 
context 
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4.2. PHENOMENA 
The phenomena that we theorize about are both natural objects and 
human made artifacts and activities (figure 4.2, relationship 1). 
Institutions provide phenomena in the form of behaviours, beliefs, 
and attitudes; the natural environment gives us flora and fauna, 
geological structures, the sky, stars, and the oceans; and technology 
provides us with a whole host of constructed artifacts to theorize 
about. Of course, these three sources of phenomena are highly 
interrelated. As Hooker (1985) notes much of the natural world has 
been shaped by humans and has become, in a sense, a technological 
artifact. Similarly, people are both biological organisms and 
institutionalized agents. 
4.3. INSTITUTIONS 
When Kuhn (1970: 182) utilized the word paradigm to mean the 
thing that a community of scientific specialists "share that accounts 
for the relative fulness of their professional communication and the 
relative unanimity of their professional judgments" he introduced 
an important social element into the study of scientific processes. A 
paradigm is meant to be a distinctly scientific entity but has been 
used in a vast number of contexts to mean, something like, a shared 
set of beliefs and values. Once we start talking about an entity that 
describes a shared set of beliefs and values we step in the territory of 
sociologists who have perfectly adequate names for these entities. 
They call them institutions or social structures. 
Sociologist Anthony Giddens (1982: 10) gives us a good starting 
characterization of an institution: 
To speak of 'institutionalised' forms of social conduct is to refer to modes of 
belief and behaviour that occur and recur - or, as the terminology of modem 
social theory would have it, are socially reproduced - across long spans of 
time and space. Language is an excellent example of such a form of 
institutionalised activity, or institution, since it is so fundamental to social 
life. All of us speak languages which none of us as individuals, created, 
although we all use language creatively. But many other aspects of social life 
may be institutionalised : that is, become commonly adopted practices that 
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persist in recognisably similar form across the generations. Hence we can 
speak of economic institutions, political institutions, and so on. 
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An institution in these terms is not a social or political organization 
like a hospital, university, church, or school, although there 
certainly are medical, educational, and religious institutions 
(Giddens, 1982: Chapter 1). Rather, an institution is a set of 
structured beliefs and activities. In particular I think the following 
features are important in the characterization of the concept of 
institution: 
Collectivity 
An institution arises out of the collective activities of a group of 
people. It both shapes and is shaped by the actions of individuals. 
Manicas & Secord (1983: 408, emphasis mine) note that 
social structure is simultaneously the relatively enduring product but also the 
medium of motivated human action ... Thus, social structures (e.g. language) 
are reproduced and transformed by action, but they preexist for individuals. 
They enable persons to become persons and to act (meaningfully and 
intentionally), yet at the same time, they are "coercive", limiting the ways 
we can act. It is thus that action is social, for, as acquiring the particular 
skills, compentencies, habits, and forms of thought presuppose human 
capacities, they also presuppose society in the double sense that in acting we 
use and we express social structures. Social structures are, accordingly, 
constituted by the motivated human acts that either reproduce or transform 
the very structures that are its medium ... But social structure is rarely 
intentionally reproduced; social change and history is the cumulative product 
of the largely unintended consequences of our intentional acts. People marry 
for psychological reasons, not to reproduce the structural form that the family 
takes, an unintended consequence of their acts. 
Domain Specificity 
Institutions are domain specific. That is, institutions are about 
specific aspects of society such as language, science, education, and 
commerce. Institutions, although inextricably intertwined, are about 
importantly different things and concern different types of activity 
and understanding at all but the most abstract level. 
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Sociologists commonly study institutions such as: the family, 
political-economic institutions (e.g., capitalist government), 
language, and science. Institutions, like theories, can be usefully 
divided into framework institutions (e.g., psychology (human 
nature), natural science, political economy, sociology, religion, and 
language) and specific institutions (e.g., law, family, education, 
physics, biology). Furthermore, specific institutions can either 
encompass a topic (e.g., the western family or western tertiary 
education) or a particular example of the topic (e.g., the Kennedy 
family, or Oxford university) (Wellman, 1990, makes this distinction 
with theories). This taxonomy provides us with a slightly tighter 
characterization than that generally offered by sociologists. 
Cultural Relativity 
The exact beliefs and activities of institutions vary from society to 
society and culture to culture. For instance, the Pakeha institution of 
law is quite different to the Maori institution of law (Jackson, 1988). 
Implicitness 
As individuals we contribute to, and are shaped by, a number of 
institutions. Institutions, like cognitive theories, are implicit 
entities, or patterns of constantly interacting units (concepts in the 
case of theories, individuals and groups of individuals in the case of 
institutions). Institutions thus overlap in important ways. 
Conflictual 
The individuals that make up an institution rarely, if ever, have the 
same theories about how a particular domain of phenomena work 
and should be best understood and acted upon. Thagard (1988: 186) 
suggests that 
Whereas individuals are generally expected to maintain consistency and 
coherence in their beliefs, a community can be expected to have sharply 
competing views. Proponents of different theories fight it out in the journals 
and other public forums. This kind of competition may well be better suited to 
the goals of scientific research than a more monolithic approach would be, 
since it is difficult to predict from what quarters good new ideas would come. 
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The fact that individuals within an institution differ in their beliefs 
and actions means that an institution is usually characterized by 
conflict caused by the resistance of one group of individuals to the 
ideas and activities of another. It is a hallmark of many institutions 
that this resistance is suppressed by those who hold more power 
(Parker, 1989). Power can suppress resistance in a number of ways. 
The most obvious is via the expenditure of military and punitive 
political resources. Unfortunately, for the average tyrant, this 
method usually proves to be an impossible burden and results in 
revolution or the internal collapse of the institution. A better way to 
use power is to instil, what Marx called, a false consciousness in the 
members of the resisting groups, so that they effectively convince 
themselves that there is no conflict of interests and that their 
problems are due to something else entirely, such as their own 
innate laziness or lack of ability (Goodwin, 1982; Parker, 1989; 
McLellan, 1975; Coser, 1977). A false consciousness, in our terms, 
would consist of the transmission of the dominant classes' ontology, 
explanatory framework, and methodology into the theories of the 
underclasses. 
It may seem sensible to suggest that there exist, along with lay 
theories, lay institutions. However, it is at this point that explicating 
the social and institutional nature of human knowing exposes a 
'high level' collapse in the distinction between scientific knowing 
and everyday knowing. This comes about because, since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, scientific technologies and 
institutions have increasingly come to shape both the scientific and 
lay worlds (Spiegel-Rosing, 1977). For instance, a lay person's theory 
about the hole in the ozone layer or the greenhouse effect has been 
created by the transmission of scientific theories (albeit often 
incompletely) through advanced communication systems. Similarly 
concepts and ideas in psychology and sociology have filtered into 
everyday speech and thought through institutions such as formal 
education and the media, so that now it is not uncommon to hear 
laypeople talking about behaviour being caused by unconscious 
desires, or by reinforcement, or of people coming from certain social 
classes or acting because of their socio-economic status. Mulkay 
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(1977) suggests that pure science can be usefully contrasted with 
applied science when addressing the issue of (scientific) institutional 
influences on people's theories about the world. He notes 
Applied research ... is undertaken on behalf of 'laymen' [sic], that is, persons 
not actively engaged in research of any kind, and communicated to 'laymen', 
to be used for purposes other than the further extension of scientific 
knowledge. In contrast, the results of pure research are intended for and 
communicated to other researchers, to be used by them in their own pursuit of 
scientific knowledge. The intellectual procedures adopted in pure and 
applied research are frequently indistinguishable and the scientific results 
often identical. 
(Mulkay, 1977: 94-95) 
There are no distinctly scientific or lay institutions or technologies. 
Indeed, an important part of the character of most institutions 
consists of the power relations between an overclass of technologists 
and producers of 'expert' theory (ideology) and an underclass of 
users and victims of that technology or ideology. 
Theoretical 
Institutions can be viewed as the sociocultural version of a theory. 
They are the vehicles for providing us with our social transmit, 
which, in Ruben's (1977: 109) words, is 
a portion of the collected wisdom (or values) of society in which [people find 
themselves. They receive] such knowledge through [their] learning contacts 
with others, either before [they are] able to reflect critically on what [they 
are] learning or often simply as a matter of fact without critical reflection, 
even if [they are] capable of it. 
Sociologists tend to be rather vague as to what it is that is socially 
transmitted. The understanding of theories presented in this work 
provides us with a more detailed answer. An institution provides 
people with 1) a way of categorizing its domain (an ontology), 2) a 
way of explaining how things in the world relate to each other (an 
explanatory framework), and the ways in which we should explore 
and interact with that world (methodological constraints). Although 
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an institution is typically wracked by conflict there usually exists 
some basic agreement on these fundamental aspects of the domain. 
As Hacking (1983: 7) notes, people who have a point-by-point 
opposition to each others beliefs usually agree on many underlying 
basics. Atop this basic agreement there exists a network of conflicts 
and disagreements. This network of conflicting relationships 
actually characterizes the institution. An institution, like a theory, is 
in permanent flux, as its groups vie to influence its ontology, 
explanatory framework, and methodology. A 'healthy institution' is 
one in which all of its participants are encouraged to think and act 
critically and collectively (West, 1987; Haig, 1991b). That is, where 
there is 
the elimination of relations of power with the activation of people's 'self 
activity', their independent pursuit of a free formative practice (West, 1987: 
152). 
Institutions influence Theories 
Institutions often supply us with beliefs and values for our 
framework theories (figure 4.2, relationship 2). For example, the 
institution of modern western physics is part of the wider 
institution of western science. Western science is allied with other 
western conceptions of human nature, society, and political 
economy (see Spiegel-Rosing & de Solla Price, 1977). It may seem far 
fetched to suppose that the institution of western science can affect 
our everyday theories about the motion of objects. On the contrary, I 
hope to show that institutions play a significant role in such 
theories. 
Intuitive physics research has revealed that women tend to be more 
likely to utilize an impetus theory of the motion (as opposed to 
classical theory) of objects than men. McCloskey and Kohl (1983) 
found slight sex differences in two of their experiments and 
concluded that this could be accounted for because more men had 
received physics training than women. This in itself is an indication 
of the concepts, explanations, and methodological constraints that 
dominate in the institution of western science (Shaw, 1991; 
Schiebinger, 1989; Fisch, 1977). The ontology of this institution 
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includes the concept of the scientist as a person embracing culturally 
defined masculine values such as achievement orientation, 
independence, endurance, intellectual self-confidence, research 
competence and strong goal orientation (Fisch, 1977: 292). 
Explanations of women's unsuitability for scientific thinking often 
include innate differences (e.g. dominance of the left hemisphere 
[Schiebinger, 1989]), social roles and expectations of women as 
mothers and home keepers (Fisch, 1977: 292), and women's 
disinterest in things scientific. Methodological constraints on 
women entering into science in force include the gendered use of 
space, lack of publicity of women's scientific achievements, sexist 
treatment by male colleagues and staff, and sexual harassment 
(Shaw, 1991). 
Kaiser et al. (1985) found that physics training did not account for all 
of the sex differences in people's understandings of the motion of 
objects. It is thus likely that it is not just the institution of science 
that determines who should acquire certain types of knowledge 
about mechanics. Many of the activities that may lead a person to 
adopt a classical theory of motion are activities that various 
institutions in western society deem as more suitable for men to 
pursue. These include activities such as the use of firearms, aircraft, 
and other mechanical devices. 
Institutions, then, select the type of knowledge that its various 
groups obtain for their framework theories according to the power 
structures that exist within that institution. So, for example, 
undergraduate students at some American universities are unlikely 
to receive a useful, global, and critical education because the power 
structure of the universities is such that they are not valued as 
highly as post graduate students (Gimenez, 1989; Rau & Baker, 1989). 
One of the most important methodological constraints institutions 
place on its members is whether or not people are encouraged to 
value deep and broad knowledge of the phenomena in the domain. 
University students, scientists, politicians, and people in other high 
paying occupations typically value deep and broad knowledge more 
than the unemployed or the underclasses. This is not an innate 
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phenomenon but a byproduct of institutional stratification. And this 
value system is reinforced by the commensurate occupational 
stratification. People who work in laborious and repetitive factory 
jobs are not given the time nor the opportunity to extend their 
theories about the world. They are placed in static and 
unstimulating environments (without access to technology to 
extend their senses) which provide little in the way of interesting 
phenomena to theorize about. Indeed they are placed in such 
unstimulating and 'safe' environments (and feel as if they cannot 
change any of it because of the power relations in place) that the 
impetus for theorizing, that is, problem solving for survival, is 
absent. 
Theories influence Institutions 
The influence of institutions by theories is, given our Western 
reductionist and individualist philosophy of society, the least 
surprising relationship of the theory-institution dialectic. We need 
not look further than the work of Karl Marx, F. W. Taylor, Albert 
Einstein, Kate Sheppard, Germaine Greer, Martin Luther King, 
Gandhi, Te Whiti, or Adam Smith to see how personal theories 
have had a massive influence on institutions and societies. But it 
would be naive to suggest that an individual's theory can have a 
major social influence just because it seems a very good theory. In 
addition, there are numerous social and political factors that are 
necessary for a theory to be spread about in an influential manner. 
These factors include such things as fame, ability to communicate, 
support (or suppression) from powerful (or vocal) groups or 
individuals, alternative available theories, and so on. 
4.4. TECHNOLOGY 
Technology and Theories 
Technology plays a very important role in the formulation of 
people's theories about the world (figure 4.2, relationship 3), 
particularly in modern industrialised nations, although technology 
per se, includes any tool, instrument, or artifact that a person utilises 
to alter their surroundings in order to supplement our natural 
evolved capacities. Technology can extend our ability to see, or hear, 
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or communicate, speed up or automatize tasks that can be done 
without tools, protect us from dangerous stimuli (bright light, fierce 
heat), and give us the strength to move or alter things that would 
otherwise be unmovable. Thus, technology standardly gives us 
insights into a new reality (Giere, 1988: 137-140; Hacking, 1983: 
Chapter 11). It either directly reveals new patterns that we could not 
perceive before because they were too distant, too small, too 
inaccessible, or too dangerous for us to approach (e.g. via 
microscopes, telescopes, computer enhanced images, and so on), or it 
saves us time and resources which we would have to expend if we 
relied in our natural abilities (e.g. shelter for safety, books for 
retaining memories, and so on). These new patterns provide us with 
new data for constructing our theories. 
Gerd Gigerenzer (1990) suggests that within psychology the 
technology and tools used in our research actually become part of 
our theories about human thought and action. So that, for instance, 
Harold Kelley (1967) thought people did 'naive ANOVAs' in their 
heads when thinking about the world. Other common technological 
metaphors in psychology have included the steam engine (Freud), 
the telephone switchboard (early cognition), and of course the 
computer. Technology, thus, 1) provides new avenues for observing 
the world, and 2) supplies us with interesting new models for 
developing theoretical concepts. 
Technology and Institutions 
Technology also embodies both the institutional and theoretical 
knowledge that is required to create it (figure 4.2, relationship 4). The 
world we see is a world constrained by our technology's power to 
expose it, and our technology's power to expose the world is largely 
dependent on the assumptions about the world implicit in the 
construction of that technology. So, for instance, the electron and the 
proton (see Hacking, 1983 and Giere, 1988 respectively) have become 
tools in the creation of new theoretical subatomic particles. The 
nature of theoretical entities like quarks embody within them beliefs 
about the proton, because the construction of particle accelerators 
and cyclotrons is based on our knowledge of things like the charge 
and mass of protons (Giere, 1988: 140). Our view of quarks would be 
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different if our view of protons was different. In a sense then, our 
technology is a physical manifestation of our values and beliefs 
about the world, and in this day and age those values and beliefs are· 
by no means all positive. Susantha Goonatilake (1984: 121) notes that 
technology "reflects the class relations of a particular society, the 
nature of its economic system, its patterns of conflict and conflict . 
management." 
Thus, the existence of nuclear weapons as a solution to the problem 
of conflict, the use of drift nets as a cheap and easy solution to 
collecting fish, the construction of massive supertankers to transport 
vast amounts of crude oil, are all examples of technology instilled 
with the values of high yield, low cost, short sightedness, and 
disrespect for the finite resources of people and the world. 
Since technology embodies the values of our theories and 
institutions, the introduction of technology into a society acts as a 
'social gene', often transplanting the institution values and conflicts 
of the technology's society of origin (Goonatilake, 1984: 122). For 
instance, the introduction of mass production and privitization 
technologies into Africa and South-East Asia has resulted in the 
expansion of the capitalist free market and its allied specific 
institutions (such as international banks, the English language, 
unemployment, and Western science) into the Third World (Sardar 
& Rosser-Owen, 1977; Ellwood, 1990; Rose, 1988; Goonatilake, 1984: 
Chapter 6). 
Technology and the Natural Environment 
Technology has also had massive effects on our natural 
environment, supplying us with a whole host of new, and often 
problematic, phenomena for people to theorize about (figure 4.2, 
relationship 5). Hooker (1985: 188) notes that 
The fact that science is remaking the world around it hardly needs • emphasizing. From our impact on the global climate, forests, ocean ecologies, 
hydrology, and so on to the explosion of urban megalopolises, manmade [sic] 
agricultural species and electronic communication networks, and in a hundred 
other like ways, science-based and -organized technological development has 
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been transforming the biophysical world in quite dramatic ways into a human 
artifact in new patterns. These patterns have not been universally approved, 
far from it, but they are human designs nevertheless. 
Since technologies often reflect the values of the institutions that 
gave birth to them we must constantly subject our institutions to 
critical analysis in order to ensure that we do not construct 
environmentally destructive technologies. The technocratic attitude 
that engineers and technologists simply produce the technology and 
have no moral responsibility for its effects on people and the 
environment cannot and should not be upheld by the scientific 
community. 
Professional engineers are acknowledged designers, advisers and construction 
experts. In order to maintain this elevated position they need to re-
emphasise their advisory role to the public and their advisory 
responsibilities to the profession itself. Engineering is not free of social or 
political bias. Professional engineers cannot simply present their opinion and 
depart (Shaw, 1990: 69). 
Technology, then, can no longer be viewed as a value-neutral aspect 
of human existence. Technology is used to shape, not only our 
environment, but also our societies and our personal theories about 
the world. Technology brings with it new windows onto the world. 
We must make sure that these windows do not serve to oppress 
people or destroy our natural environment. 
4.5. EVOLUTION 
There is no doubt that the natural environment has a vast influence 
on our social and cognitive processes (figure 4.2, relationship 6). 
From an ecological perspective human beings are subsystems within 
ecosystems and have evolved in a reciprocal way with that 
environment. 
Adaptable species do not only passively adapt to certain environments, they 
also change them and thereby create new environments. Wombats dig 
burrows, beavers build dams. In fact, the evolutionary process has 
transformed our planet. For example, forests, savannahs and tundras were all 
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created by evolutionary processes. f:~en the oxygen in our atmosphere is said 
to be a result of biological processes. Those species which are adapted, not to 
a narrow ecological niche but to a wider spectrum of environments, are also 
more likely to migrate and live successfully in new lands, transforming them 
in tum. In a dynamic interaction species change the world which in tum poses 
new demands on their adaptive capacities. Those who are too slow will 
perish, those who adapt fast enough will further increase the rate of change. 
This exponential growth is characteristic of evolutionary processes. Many 
species will earlier or later lose in the evolutionary gamble, their 
adaptability will not suffice. The alarming rate of species going extinct in 
this century provides ample evidence of the threats a continuously changing 
environment poses to its inhabitants. And this is the key notion of 
adaptability, and hence intelligence: highly adaptable species achieve 
their largest advantage in a dynamic environment (Hahlweg & Hooker, 1988: 
106-107). 
Thus, just as we leave our mark on our environment so our 
environment becomes deeply embedded within our human 
makeup. Psychologists and biologists have speculated as to the 
shaping effects of the environment on the physical, behavioural, 
social, and mental aspects of humans. The bulk of evolutionary 
research has focused on adaptive physical features (such as armour 
plating, long legs, and so on). More recently it has been realized that 
physical features are deeply related to behaviours (for instance, long 
legs are optimal for browsing foliage from treetops, developed leg 
muscles are used for extreme bursts of speed) and many relevant 
behaviours have turned out to be distinctly social, benefiting a group 
of organisms rather than an individual. More recently still, 
Cosmides and Tooby (1987), and Shepard (1984; 1987) have suggested 
that it is important to speculate as to how evolution has influenced 
the cognitive aspect of animal life. 
4.5.1. Species Programmes 
We have discussed the idea that an institution is a vehicle for 
transmitting a society's ontology, explanatory framework, and· 
methodology of a particular domain. There remains a question as to 
whether there is a comparable vehicle for transmitting a species' (or 
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phylum's, or genus') understanding of the world into our theories. 
Such a vehicle would be something like a species programme for 
categorizing, explaining, and focusing actions on, the world. It 
would be physically instantiated in the phenotype of an organism, in 
the structure of its modalities and motor system as well as in the 
geometry of its nervous system. Clearly such an entity would be 
common to both scientists and laypeople. The obvious mechanism 
responsible for the creation of this programme would be evolution 
by natural selection. It just so happens that a number of 
psychologists, biologists, and philosophers have speculated on the 
nature of such a functional entity (see Dupre, 1987a, for a selection of 
relevant papers). 
In the literature I have identified what seems to be two different 
approaches to understanding the nature of 'biological knowledge'. 
One approach, pioneered by Cosmides and Tooby (1987), suggests 
that people have a number of innate theories about specific domains 
of worldly phenomena. They consider the cognitive level of 
explanation to be the missing link between a workable theory of 
how evolution may influence behaviour. The second approach 
suggests that people (and many other animals) have evolved 
processes that allow an organism to construct its own individual 
theories about the world. In particular, adherents in to this approach 
have focused on how species have internalised widespread, and 
often very abstract, regularities in the environment. Shepard (1984; 
1987), for instance, suggests that many organisms have, hard-wired 
into their nervous systems, an innate appreciation of the rotation 
period of the Earth. This reveals itself in an animal's circadian 
rhythms. 
These two approaches can be combined to give us a rough idea of the 
nature of a species programme. It would very likely consist of a set of 
innate specific theories for dealing with biologically important 
phenomena. That is, for dealing with phenomena that we cannot 
afford to experiment with by trial and error. Atop these basic innate 
theories would sit a set of innate system operating principles which 
would guide and focus personal theory construction of the 'trial and 
error' type. Figure 4.3 represents these ideas diagrammatically. 
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It is clear that modern humans typically ignore the assessment of the 
environment afforded by many of their innate theories. However, it 
seems likely that they do play a significant role in some judgments. 
For instance, Holland et al. (1986) speculate that biological 
constraints are evident in our inability to accurately gauge the 
acceleration of objects (which is the fundamental concept in classical 
mechanics). They suggest that (in evolutionary terms) the 
perception of acceleration has little benefit for fitness, whereas 
perception of velocity (that is, moving objects), something that we 
are relatively good at, clearly does. It seems that the intuitive theory 
of motion shared by many people is a theory heavily influenced by 
the concept of velocity. 
Similarly, the apparent inability of laypeople to apply modus tollens 
in deductive reasoning exercises (Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972) 
does not occur when the situation set up by the experimenter 
involves catching a cheat (Anderson, 1985: 267-269). Cosmides' (1985, 
cited in Shepard, 1987) PhD dissertation suggests that psychologists 
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find these effects in the domain of 'lay logic' because, during the 
Pleistocene period, human beings evolved innate specific theories 
that dealt with biologically important social phenomena such as 
cheating within the social group. 
Success and stability of small groups of hunter-gatherers depended on the 
general maintenance of reciprocity in which individuals helped each other 
and relied upon the return of favor when it was needed. Under these long-
prevailing circumstances, a sensitivity to cheaters - those who accept the 
benefits without paying the costs - attained a high level of development. 
Thus even today, nothing is more likely to engender anger than the refusal of 
any reciprocation by one whom we have repeatedly helped at appreciable 
cost to ourselves (Shepard, 1987: 253). 
In sum, then, it appears that we may possess some basic, but quite 
specific, innate theories that encompass aspects of the world that 
may endanger or enhance survival. The next section speculates 
about the structure of these innate theories. 
4.5.2. Innate Specific Theories 
Cosmides and Tooby (1987) produce evidence to suggest that the 
hominid ancestors of modern humans were almost totally reliant 
on a large number of relatively inflexible innate specific theories. 
They note that these Darwinian algorithms (as they call them) 
served to produce mental models to deal with real life phenomena 
from specific domains such as aggressive threat, mate choice, sexual 
behaviour, pair-bonding, parenting, parent-off spring conflict, 
friendship, kinship, resource accrual, resource distribution, disease 
avoidance, predator avoidance, and social exchange. In their words, 
Darwininan algorithms are 
specialized learning mechanisms that organize experience into adaptively 
meaningful schemas or frames ... When activated by appropriate 
environmental or proprioceptive information, these innately specified 
"frame-builders" should focus attention, organize perception and memory, and 
call up specialized procedural knowledge that will lead to domain-
appropriate inferences, judgments, and choices. Like Chomsky's language 
THE WIDER PICTURE 106 
acquisition device, these inference procedures allow you to "go beyond the 
information given" - to reason adaptively even in the face of incomplete or 
degraded information. 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1987: 286). 
They suggest that the domains that the innate specific theories 
encompass include those sort of things that would be relevant to 
the environment in Pleistocene conditions (2 000 000 to 10 000 years 
ago) in which 99% of the evolution of homo sapiens has occured. 
Thus, our innate specific theories would not cover aspects of the, 
even relatively ancient, world, such as movement in vehicles, the 
use of machinery, or large scale political systems. Cosmides and 
Tooby note that it is likely that we have evolved the capacity to 
generate our own constructed specific theories relatively recently in 
our evolutionary history. This is in contrast to the popular idea that 
the human mind is, and has been for thousands of years, a basically 
domain general mechanism. Cosmides and Tooby (1987) note that 
the benefits of increased flexibility of this general system are tiny 
compared to the costs to fitness incurred by a system that requires 
knowledge to be verified by trial and error. 
Given this point of view, we can speculate that the ability to form 
framework theories and to create learnt specific theories 
complements, but does not replace, innate specific theories. The 
ability to create specific theories to deal with novel phenomena 
increases the adaptability of organisms in a rapidly changing 
environment. Indeed, as Hahlweg and Hooker (1988: 107) note, 
"highly adaptable species achieve their largest advantage in a 
dynamic environment." 
Innate specific theories, like learned theories, comprise an ontology, 
explanatory framework, and methodological constraints. Although 
Cosmides and Tooby do not explicitly discuss Darwinian algorithms 
in these terms, their research suggests that these three aspects of 
theories are indeed important. 
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Ontology 
According to Cosmides and Tooby (1987: 286) Darwinian algorithms 
"organize perception and memory". In other words, they suggest 
that in order for a Darwinian algorithm to work it must possess a 
series of concepts about phenomena relevant to a specific domain. 
Thus, the 'incest' algorithm that they analyze (pp. 297-298) requires 
concepts of 'kin' and 'nonkin'. 
The structure and movements of our bodies can be viewed as 
providing us with a very basic ontology. To say that biological 
knowledge only constrains our knowledge of the world is 
misleading. In the course of our evolution, natural selection has 
seen fit to expose us to a particular type of world by giving us 
perceptual processes that open a window onto a specific useful (in 
terms of fitness) window of reality. So the ontology that our 
biological knowledge provides us with includes: the colours of 
objects (in particular, the important 11 focal colours), the 
macroscopic world; the distal, rather than proximal, world, a world 
of differing temperature, a world of moving (e.g. looming) objects, 
etc. This window provides a foundation for a knowledge of that 
world. By interacting with the world, through education and 
communication, and by the construction of technology, we open up 
new windows on this world, but these are windows that, at base, are 
founded on and constrained by our biological ontology. For instance, 
we can enter the microscopic world by looking through a 
microscope, but we are still looking at the microscopic world as if it 
were the macroscopic world and often we make the mistake of 
importing macroscopic ideas into it. 
Explanatory framework 
The organization of memory and perception will also require an 
explanatory framework in order for the organism to embed the 
experience of some phenomena in a wider context. An animal that 
hears the nearby howl of a predator will need to know that the 
predator is likely to attack soon. That is, the explanation of the howl 
is that a nearby predator (with the disposition to howl) is making it. 
An explanatory framework enables an animal to predict the flow of 
events based on "degraded information" (that is, based on the 
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activation of many concepts based on a small amount of perceptual 
input). 
Methodological constraints 
Darwinian algorithms must "call up specialized procedural 
knowledge that will lead to domain-appropriate inferences, 
judgments, and choices." (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987: 286). In other 
words, these innate specific theories need to contain some plan for 
the actions that an organism must carry out to deal with (attend to, 
escape from, get at) the phenomena in question. 
4.5.3. Innate Theory Generation Principles 
A number of researchers have suggested that human beings share 
some innate basic principles which focus our theorizing processes. 
The Internalization of Long Term Regularities 
Roger Shepard (1984; 1987) contends that some enduring regularities 
of the world are likely to have constituted part of the deep innate 
knowledge in the brains (and bodies) of organisms for millions of 
years. Shepard suggests that many of the regularities that have 
occured on Earth throughout the history of biological evolution are 
likely to be 'internalised' within the bodies (perceptual, cognitive, 
and motor processes) of most organisms. Shepard does not make it 
clear what constitutes 'internalization', but it is likely that he means 
the evolution of a combination of cognitive and perceptual 
processes that give us a particular sensorimotor window onto the 
world. This window organizes the patterns of energy that we sense. 
So, for instance, our innate understanding of the geometry of three 
dimensional space gives us the automatic capacity to understand 
that a sequence of similar energy patterns moving across our 
photoreceptors is evidence of a moving object. In particular Shepard 
(1987: 263) notes that we automatically and innately know that "for 
any two positions of an object in three-dimensional space, there 
exists a unique axis in space such that the object can be carried from 
one position to the other by a combination of a translation along the 
axis together with a rotation about it". Shepard (1984) has conducted 
a number of studies with apparent motion phenomena that support 
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the view that, given a pair of visual stimuli shown at different 
positions and separated by a small amount of time, people will 
automatically hypothesize that they have seen a single moving 
object. Shepard (1984) suggests that these internal constraints on 
perception also serve to constrain our dreams, images, and other 
mental- representations. Johnson (1991) has developed this idea in 
some detail (see below). 
Shepard (1987) has studied a number of other enduring aspects of 
the world which humans have internalized (including the 
terrestrial circadian period, the three degrees of freedom of terrestrial 
illumination, and the metric of functional equivalence) and which 
provide constraints on our theorizing processes. 
The terrestrial circadian period gives many animals the ability to 
continue their particular diurnal or nocturnal activities without the 
benefit of external cues such as light and heat. 
Our ability to divide up the visible spectrum into eleven basic focal 
colours (Anderson, 1985: 317-321) is a result of the internalization of 
the three degrees of terrestrial illumination. According to Shepard 
(1987) we automatically 'score' a perceived colour on three 
dimensions: a light-dark dimension, a yellow-blue dimension, and a 
red-green dimension. Knowledge of these basic types of colours 
facilitates object identification. In our theorizing it may serve to 
constrain the nature of our mental representations. 
The internalized metric of functional equivalence gives us a basis 
for judging the similarity of situations. Shepard speculates that 
similarity is based on an exponential decay function. That is, objects 
that differ on some sort of feature will be thought to be 
proportionately less similar than the difference of the features 
would indicate. This sort of very abstract principle would have 
important consequences for theorizing. In particular it would have 
cause a conservative categorization of entities within a theory. Only 
'things' that are obvious members of a category would be admitted 
(or at least admitted with full membership). This, of course, would 
influence the nature of our theories' ontologies in a way that a 
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linear understanding, for example, of similarity would not. This 
conservativeness and caution in judging the similarity of members 
of a certain category or concept would certainly be a useful survival 
device. It may mean that, for instance, an animal may shy away 
from a particularly large or colourful member of its own species in 
order to avoid a predator of similar appearance. This caution would 
no doubt pay off in important biological situations. 
A similar line of thinking speculates about the innateness of general 
theorizing procedures such as retroduction. Thagard (1988: 71) notes 
that Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), the creator of the concept of 
retroduction, "maintained that [retroduction] to scientific 
hypotheses would be impossible if nature had not endowed us with 
some special faculty for making good guesses." Similarly, 
contemporary sociobiologists have suggested that people might have 
evolved epigenetic rules for making inferences, such as 
hypothesizing a common cause given the occurence of two similar 
events (Lumsden & Wilson, 1981 cited in Giere, 1988). 
Thagard (1988) himself speculates that humans probably have some 
basic innate principles for spreading activation and triggering 
inductions, and that these constraints are enough for humans to do 
science, to use language, and to carry out many other (biologically 
unimportant?) social and cognitive activities. Unlike Chomsky 
(1980), he does not feel that humans have a number of relatively 
autonomous innate modules for carrying out various different 
human activities. 
The following section focuses on Mark Johnson's (1991) ideas about 
the role of the human body in knowing. Like Shepard, he speculates 
that humans share some basic organizing principles for our 
theorizing abilities, but, whereas Shepard seems to suggest that 
humans have internalized these principles into our nervous 
systems, Johnson suggests that the structure of the human body, its 
movements and sensory modalities, provide us with a filter that 
leads people to form deep, abstract, schemas for organizing and 
directing our theories about the world. 
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Knowing Through the Body 
The idea that our whole body is important in all sorts of theorizing 
is central to what Mark Johnson (1991) calls an image schematic 
view of cognition. He argues that all of our knowing about the 
world is predicated upon our sensorimotor experiences in the world. 
There is a significant amount of research which shows that our 
cognitive structures map the world in an imagistic way. By 
'imagistic' Johnson means 'in an manner similar to the way we 
perceive the world through our different modalities'. That is, in a 
continuous spatial and analogue way rather than in a discrete, 
componential, and propositional way. He thus sides with people 
such as Stephen Kosslyn, Roger Shepard, and Philip Johnson-Laird, 
in arguing that images comprise a important type of mental 
representation that cannot be reduced to propositional statements 
without losing some important procedural capabilities. Ronald 
Giere (1988: 136) supports such a view when he notes that 
humans, by virtue of their biological evolution, have a highly developed 
capacity to represent spatial relationships. This capacity is located in the 
preverbal parts of the brain, closely connected with the motor control system. 
The overwhelming tendency among experimental nuclear physicists to think 
and communicate in terms of diagrams suggests that they are tapping these 
sorts of preverbal cognitive and sensorimotor capacities. 
This emphasis on the role of perceptual images in cognition makes a 
lot of sense when we consider the evolution of the human mind. 
Our ability to represent has arisen from the need to model the 
perceived environment so that we can 1) avoid noxious things 
before we bang into them and 2) find useful things in a systematic 
way. In order to do these things we need to represent ourselves in a 
wider physical context and create plans for moving ourselves about 
it (see Johnson-Laird, 1983: Chapter 15). Johnson (1991) holds that it 
is just these movements about a physical environment that 
underlie all of our thinking. Thus, in a sense, all of our cognition is 
implicated in our perception of the movement of our bodies in the 
physical world. He has isolated an number of image-schemas which 
expound this idea. An image schema is an abstracted pattern that 
emerges through- our sensorimotor activity "as we orient ourselves 
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spatially and temporally, direct our perceptual focus for various 
purposes, move our bodies as functional unities, and manipulate 
objects to accomplish our ends." (Johnson, 1991: 8). Image schemas 
are, in the terms of this work, extremely abstracted problem 
schemas. They are innate insofar as the biology of our bodies is 
responsible for their existence and nature. Johnson catalogues a 
number of these image schemas such as the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL 
schema, the CONTAINER schema, and the !TERA TION schema. He 
characterizes the CONTAINER schema in the following way: 
We experience physical and bodily containment in every aspect of our lives, 
and this provides imaginative structure for our understanding of all sorts of 
abstract containment. Whether in two or three dimensions, a container 
consists of an interior, a boundary, and an, exterior. 
Whether we are in bed, in a house, in love, in a club, or in the middle of a 
race, we experience and understand each of these situations by means of an 
imaginative schema of containment. 
(Johnson, 1991: 13). 
Johnson goes on to note that image schemas are used literally (i.e. of 
things that we actually perceive) and metaphorically (i.e. of things 
that we cannot perceive, such as functional relationships). For 
instance, he provides a detailed analysis of how the CONTAINER 
schema can be used to explain aspects of formal logic such as the law 
of the excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction (see 
Johnson, 1991: 13-14) 
Johnson argues that all of our abstract linguistic, mathematical, and 
logical forms of reasoning are founded on this imagistic process. 
This is in marked contrast to the dominant reductionist approach in 
the cognitive sciences, of reducing many aspects of cognition to 
elementary functional primitives (such as symbols and 
propositions), and holding that these are of primary interest and 
combine to form the higher analog-type forms of representation. 
Johnson says that this view turns the reality of the situation on its 
head - our image-type cognition has given rise to the functional 
primitive approach, not the other way around. 
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In summary, Johnson (1991) shows that scientific and everyday 
theorizing are predicated upon the same sort of structures and 
processes. Both types of theorizing rely on image-schemas derived 
from our sensorimotor activities in our environment. 
Conclusions about Innate Knowledge 
The idea that innate knowledge plays a significant role in human 
theorizing is one widely accepted by many cognitive and social 
scientists. The answer to the question of just how evolution can 
literally 'put ideas into our heads' is more speculative. Certainly the 
structure of the human nervous system, sensory organs, and motor 
abilities, are all subject to the shaping effects of natural selection. 
Modern biology has a good grasp of how physical and physiological 
aspects of organisms adapt to their environments. Just how 
evolutionary theory can be extended to encompass functional 
phenomena such as cognition and society is a question that is only 
now being debated by biologists, cognitive, and social scientists. 
What I hope to have shown in the preceding section is that the 
evolved structure of our bodies has a significant effect on the 
structure of our theories about the world. All humans, scientists and 
laypeople alike, possess these structures and all humans use them in 
a variety of ways. 
4.6. THE RATIONAL AND THE NATURAL 
Knowledge has traditionally been viewed as something, static, 
linear, propositional, sentential, and serial (Johnson, 1991) acquired 
and utilized by an autonomous individual (Parker, 1989). As often as 
not, knowing has been viewed as an activity suitable only for an 
intellectual elite. Rationalized epistemologies have often talked 
about pieces of knowledge as if they were dictionary-like entries 
secured in spaces in our minds. For a long time there has been a bias 
toward the existence of pure reason, of knowledge as a purely 
cerebral (and linguistic) activity, and this bias has been reproduced in 
society often setting apart the wealthy ruling class of thinkers and 
intellectuals apart from the underclass of 'doers'. Hacking (1983), for 
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instance, notes that the history of science glorifies theory and 
theorists and downplays experiments and experimentalists. He 
compares his attack on the intellectual elite of theorizers with 
Marx's emphasis on the importance of human labour power (praxis) 
and its grounding in the real, material world. For Hacking and 
Johnson (1991: 7) the emphasis on a "transcendent, disembodied 
rational ego" is responsible for many of the philosophical muddles 
that thinkers have got themselves into over the centuries. In 
particular, Hacking and Johnson argue that the ubiquitous problem 
of substantiating a link between the internal mental world and the 
external physical world is a product of an unwillingness to admit 
that knowledge is a thing for doing things in the physical world, not 
an abstract autonomous thing in itself. For the adherents of 
naturalized epistemologies there is no autonomous internal mental 
world, but only a system for dealing with the one 'external' reality. 
All of our thoughts, ideas, and emotions are anchored in our 
environment no matter how abstract or fantastic they may seem. 
Thus, the view that scientists have a privileged means for collecting 
true knowledge becomes questionable. The empiricist view of 
science loses much of its gloss when we begin to realise that the so-
called objective processes of logic and mathematics are the result of 
social and biological mechanisms. The distinction between laypeople 
and scientists lies, not in the allocation of rationality to science, and 
social and emotional bias to non-science, but in the study of the 
differential treatment given the two groups by social institutions. 
The new view of knowing discussed in this chapter is, as Mark 
Johnson (1991: 8) notes, of "an active transforming of problematic 
situations that helps us better understand ourselves and our world 
and helps us pursue our mutual interests and ends." The new view 
of knowing is an approach that explicates knowing, whether done by 
a professional scientist or a layperson, in terms of our nature as 




We should be on our guard not to overestimate science and scientific 
methods when it is a question of human problems; and we should not 
assume that experts are the only ones who have a right to express 
themselves on questions affecting the organization of society. (p152). 
Albert Einstein, (from Ideas and Opinions). 
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The point of this thesis has been this: psychologists have been keen 
to point out that laypeople theorize about the world, but that their 
intuitive theories are fundamentally flawed and inaccurate. Put 
another way, psychologists have found the structures and processes 
used in science to be useful metaphors for illuminating the knowing 
activities of laypeople. At the same time, however, psychologists 
have been reluctant to endorse everyday knowing as a roughly 
scientific activity. My contention has been that in order to make 
sense of the layperson-as-a-scientist metaphor, we not only need a 
detailed conception of the thinking processes of laypeople, but we 
also need to have a developed understanding of scientific cognition. 
My argument has been that psychologists have paid primary 
attention to the former while largely ignoring the latter. 
Psychologists, especially those brought up in the North American 
tradition, have been overwhelmingly subjected to an empiricist 
view of science. Some, with a critical interest in science have a 
passing familiarity with constructionism. On the whole, however, 
psychologists have been brought up on a diet of observational 
statements, hypothetico-deductive method, Fisherian statistics 
(which includes the concepts of the control group and 
randomization), and operational definitions, unaware that the 
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philosophy inherent in these aspects of science is a strongly 
empiricist one. It is not surprising then, that science, according to 
many 'naive science' researchers, has tended to be empiricist science. 
The aim of this work has been to delve more deeply into the area of 
scientific cognition in order to make more sense of the layperson-
scientist relationship. What I have found is this: 
1) There seems to be two major foci of research in scientific 
cognition: the study of the nature and structure of theory and the 
study of scientific method. Clearly, then, any study of 'naive science' 
must make detailed reference to both of these aspects of scientific 
knowing. 
2) The philosophy of science that seems to offer the best explanation 
of the scientific process is evolutionary naturalistic realism (ENR), 
which is a particular form of scientific realism. ENR takes theories to 
be natural, social and cognitive entities that often posit the existence 
of unobservable mechanisms. Their prime focus is to say something 
about the structures and processes that exist in the real world. They 
are not merely convenient fictions for solving puzzles or linking 
observational statements. Instead they are entities that aid our 
survival in changing environment by helping us to explain 
puzzling phenomena. 
ENR also pays significant attention to scientific method, that is, the 
processes involved in the construction of theoretical entities. My 
interpretation of ENR has been to suggest that theories evolve in 
biological, social, and individual contexts. In particular, theories 
seem to evolve following a retroductive method in which our 
knowledge about the world is increased by descriptive and, more 
importantly, explanatory inference. This inference is regulated by 
our own particular views of the way the world is, by social and 
institutional contexts and by our biological makeup. This view of 
knowing thus transcends the empiricist view of knowledge which 
takes knowing to be a rational individualistic process. 
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Given this conception of science we are in a better position to draw 
parallels between scientific cognition and lay cognition. As I have 
demonstrated, I think that the two activities are remarkably similar. 
Theories 
Both scientists and laypeople construct theories. Theories are 
personal mental representations of some aspect of the environment. 
There is no requirement that theories be explicitly stated or written 
down to attain genuine 'theoryhood', although these social 
activities are certainly vital to the conception of modern science 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1988: 184-185). Instead, I take theories to be 
implicit entities that arise from the activation of a number of related 
concepts, rules, and problem solutions. They are not concrete or 
'finished' entities. Indeed, theories can be characterized by their 
continually changing and adaptive nature. Both scientists and 
laypeople possess and utilize these entities. Scientists tend to use 
them to characterize detailed aspects of the world. This requires the 
scientist to be rigorous and conceptually precise. Without these 
qualities scientist's theories would not be useful for the explanation 
of the phenomena that they represent. Laypeople, on the other 
hand, have broader and fuzzier conceptions of worldly phenomena. 
This is partly to do with the fact that laypeople do not often need to 
have conceptually precise knowledge for dealing with their 
environment, and partly to do with the fact that laypeople often do 
not have the time or resources necessary to develop their theories. 
Methods 
Since the time of the ancient Greeks many great thinkers have 
attempted to construct esoteric rituals that will result in great 
thoughts. Put another way, philosophers have sought an objective 
and rational method of theorizing that would provide purer 
knowledge than that commonly accessible by our natural abilities. It 
is only relatively recently that many philosophers have started to 
adopt a broadly naturalistic approach to epistemology. That is, they 
have begun to view scientific methods for constructing theories as 
natural activities. 
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In Chapter 3 I advocated the naturalistic method of retroductive 
explanatory inferentialism (REI). I like to think of REI as a broad 
characterization of human reasoning. REI is, thus, not a distinctly 
scientific process. Although REI is a process common to both 
scientists and laypeople, it does not follow that laypeople should 
construct theories identical to those constructed by scientists, for REI 
is extremely content-dependent. Our knowledge of the world 
actually regulates our retroductive inferences. Scientists tend to 
know different things about the world compared to laypeople. It 
thus follows that scientists will generate different theories about the 
world to laypeople. 
I suggested that the concept of expertise was a useful one when 
examining differences between scientists and laypeople. Because of 
their familiarity with particular aspects of the world, scientists 
develop sophisticated conceptions of certain domains. Scientists do 
not learn to use a new type of rationality. On the contrary, they think 
just the way they always have, but their strategies and techniques 
change with the reconceptualization of the phenomena they are 
dealing with. To a professional sociologist, for instance, the news 
that a government is intending to drop taxes in favour of 
introducing charges for a public service may result in extreme 
consternation. To a layperson who does not use the service in 
question the news may be greeted with enthusiasm. The differing 
viewpoints have nothing to do with the sociologist being more 
rational than the layperson, but rather they are due to the fact that 
the sociologist sees beneath the surface of the situation and has some 
conceptualization of how such moves may be related to such things 
as inequality and oppression. This ability to see the underlying 
mechanisms at work in the situation comes from familiarity with 
the domain, its phenomena, and their causal relationships. 
Importantly, expertise is domain specific. The sociologist in the 
above example, for instance, may have no idea that the discovery of 
a new subatomic particle may herald the introduction of fabulous 
new technologies. Her expertise extends only to the domain of 
society. To many physicists she may appear irrational about 
subatomic discoveries. 
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The Wider Picture 
All human beings have the same innate ability to understand the 
world. These abilities may be quite complex and involve both innate 
knowledge of specific biologically important domains as well as the 
capacity to generate new knowledge about the world. Scientists and 
laypeople learn a lot from just perceiving their own movements 
about the world. We detect abstract regularities and patterns which 
form important image-schemas. These schemas provide both 
laypeople and scientists with important structures for constraining 
our retroductive inference. The CONTAINER image-schema, for 
instance, stops us from reasoning that a small thing can be both 
inside and outside a container at the same time. Such an insight 
may sound extremely unexciting, but without it our thoughts about, 
and actions in, the world would be significantly different. 
Although laypeople and scientists have the same basic biological 
capacities for theorizing they are subject to differential treatment 
within social institutions. Social institutions are simply world-views 
held by a group of people about a particular domain. An institution 
is constantly in flux as different subgroups vie to influence its world-
view. Often those subgroups with more power structure the 
institutional activities in order to enforce their favoured world-view 
upon the less powerful groups. In modern industrial societies 
scientists make up a significant proportion of the dominant group in 
many institutions. In other cultures and at other times preisthoods, 
royalty, and civil services have held similar positions. Institutions 
are often structured so as to perpetuate the existing power structures. 
So, for instance, scientists maintain their grip on 'true' knowledge 
because the institutional organization ensures that scientists are 
given the time, resources, and cooperation necessary to construct 
detailed theories. Laypeople, on the other hand, are often forced into 
social and economic positions which preclude them constructing 
their own theories which may aid in their emancipation. Not all 
scientists, however, find themselves supported by institutions. 
Indeed, those who persist in advocating radical theories that may 
upset the present balance of power, often find their support and 
resources significantly curtailed. For instance, the institution of 
North American psychology cautions against the teaching and 
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publishing of theoretical research, the results of which could change 
the structure of the institution (Wachtel, 1980; Meehl, 1972; Cattell, 
1988). 
However, with constant critical analysis of our institutions it should 
be possible to shape societies in which scientists and laypeople can 
strive together to construct accurate, non-oppressive, and non-
destructive theories about the world. Here, I think, is perhaps the 
most important point of this work, which is, that we need to think 
critically about the implications of making sharp distinctions 
between scientific and lay cognition. We must be careful not to view 
these distinctions as natural and inevitable. Rather, we should 
always be on the look out for the way in which these distinctions 
could be the result of social processes, processes that we can change 
through restructuring our institutions. I hope that the, admittedly 
incomplete, framework outlined here can go some way toward 
illuminating these dimensions of the 'naive science' programme. 
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